FINAL REPORT

Mid Term Evaluation of the United Nations Multi-donor Post Conflict Fund

Period: February 2016 – June 2018

November 2018
This evaluation is administered by the Technical Secretary of the Fund.

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Accept all responsibility for the contents of this report, written at the request of the United Nations Multi-donor Post Conflict Fund.

The report does not reflect the opinions of the Fund.
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### Abbreviations Table

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AICMA</td>
<td>Integrated Action Against Antipersonnel Mines</td>
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<td>APC</td>
<td>Presidential Agency for Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEVCNR</td>
<td>Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence and non-repetition or the Truth Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONPES</td>
<td>National Council for Economic and Social Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIAN</td>
<td>National Taxes and Customs Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNP</td>
<td>National Planning Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETCR</td>
<td>Territorial Training and Reincorporation Camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC-EP</td>
<td>Revolutionary Forces of Colombia – People’s Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoC</td>
<td>Government of Colombia</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEP</td>
<td>Special Peace Jurisdiction</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>Memorandum of Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPTFO</td>
<td>Office of the Multi-Partner Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNA</td>
<td>Boys, Girls and Adolescents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODS</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIM</td>
<td>International Migration Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONU</td>
<td>United Nations Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSC</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDET</td>
<td>Development Programmes with a Territorial Focus</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peace building Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNUD</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIVJRNR</td>
<td>Integral System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNU</td>
<td>United Nations System</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOAR</td>
<td>Projects, Works and Reparation Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>UBPD</td>
<td>Disappeared Persons Search Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Safety and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPH</td>
<td>Women’s Peace &amp; Humanitarian TF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOMAC</td>
<td>The Areas Most Affected by the Armed Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZVTN</td>
<td>Local Normalization Transition Zones</td>
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The United Nations Multi-donor Post-Conflict Fund mid-term evaluation was carried out by an independent team of evaluators between September and November of 2018. It covers Fund activities between February 2016 and June 2018. In addition to conducting interviews in Bogotá, the team travelled to four Colombian departments in order to interview and survey beneficiaries of the Fund. This involved both victims of the armed conflict that received direct project support and representatives of local authorities.

According to the groups consulted - the national government, the United Nations System (SUN), donors and beneficiaries - the Fund’s rapid response actions are highly relevant. One hundred per cent of the people consulted (including beneficiaries) think that the Fund is fulfilling one of its central purposes: to respond quickly to the most pressing stabilization needs in the post-conflict territories prioritized by the national government. As the only rapid response instrument in the Fondo Colombia en Paz (Colombia in Peace Fund, the Fund has shown that it can review, approve and implement its actions more quickly than any other financing mechanism while complying with due diligence good practices.

The Fund has also shown sufficient flexibility in its governance systems to adapt strategically to post-conflict dynamics at the national and territorial levels. In particular, it has been able to analyse and understand the challenges facing the country and respond appropriately to emerging situations that could put the peace process at risk. Despite the pressure to attend to territorial needs, the Comité Directivo [hereinafter, Steering Committee] has balanced urgent issues on the ground with the need to provide strategic support to new peace-building institutions at the national level. The latter has been very important for safeguarding the peace agreement’s credibility and initial implementation at the national level.

The interviews and surveys with direct beneficiaries (both victims and municipal and departmental authorities) provide evidence of the warm welcome that local populations have given to the contribution of rapid response projects. Their testimonies are proof of the professionalism and humanity of the implementing partners and their projects, including the targeting of the interventions and the committed application of cross-cutting approaches in most cases. The beneficiaries believe that some of their most important needs have been addressed and that the Fund’s activities have generated greater confidence in local authorities when they have shown sufficient political will to involve themselves directly in the projects. All the beneficiaries consulted, felt that they had been recognised, listened to and valued,
including sensitivity to the specific needs of women, indigenous people and Afro-Colombian communities. The benefits and impacts of most of the projects implemented through the Fund, however, have not been extended to the wider community and have been limited to direct beneficiaries.

Although the evaluation has shown that the Fund has been able to identify and meet important needs efficiently and with effective short-term results, the limited scale of its intervention and the weak involvement of local state institutions has created serious difficulties for sustaining, replicating and scaling up actions. Minimal state presence and investment to reinforce and complement the stabilization projects has created an institutional vacuum that citizens interpret as a lack of commitment to the territories and agreement implementation. This means that despite the relevance of its actions and its positive impact at the local level, the Fund has been unable to fulfill its purpose of creating greater confidence in the state and the peace process.

The ability to build greater confidence in the beneficiary population in the territories will be beyond the reach of the SNU Fund if there are no large-scale complementary actions by the state. The lack of institutional state presence has been reinforced by the weakness of the Fund’s communication strategy, which has failed to position actions by the UN and other international cooperation organizations as part of a strategy planned and articulated by the national government. The Fund has also failed to communicate the achievements and scope of this first stage of the rapid implementation of the peace agreements to a wider audience in the territories. Nor has the government communicated its efforts to plan in a participatory way what follows next: The implementation of the PDET (Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial or Development Programmes with a Territorial Focus), cornerstone for agreement implementation in the territories.

After just over two years of execution, the Fund is managing a budget of US $83 million raised from international cooperation, approximately COP 127 billion per year. With the equivalent of what Bogotá local authorities spend on sports and recreation, the Fund has supported the launch of the new peace-building institutions and attended to urgent needs related to infrastructure, access to justice, income generation, victim reparation, and peace education, amongst many others, that have accumulated over decades of isolation in the territories affected by the armed conflict. These international funds have had to be divided amongst the 345 municipalities where the Fund has invested, 135 of which coincide with the 170 prioritized by the government, in view of implementing the PDET.

Consultations with beneficiaries in the territories have shown that the level of investment has been insufficient for the Fund to function effectively as a stabilization instrument, for which a large-scale presence by the state is required. This presence should include not only the territorial authorities, decentralized entities and government oversight bodies, but also the security forces so that citizens feel their presence like a protective shield against the threats of FARC dissidents, the ELN and other armed criminal organizations. In this context, the actions of UN agencies and international and national NGOs, should promote greater articulation and coordination in the territories, as this will strengthen impact in the regions and help to counteract the image of a distant and absent state.

As a result, the Steering Committee should carry out a strategic review of the Fund with the participation of civil society representatives and territorial authorities. The review should consider refocusing the Fund, so that it can deliver a more articulated, integrated and forceful intervention in the 40 municipalities with the greatest risk of instability. With the resources it has, it should also prioritize those territories with the greatest potential to leverage financial and political support from departmental and municipal governments and the private sector. The review should take advantage of the tax benefits that the National Taxes and Customs Directorate (DIAN) is offering to encourage inward investment and the creation of new businesses in the Areas Most Affected by the Armed Conflict (ZOMAC).

For stabilization actions to have more impact and sustainability, especially in generating more confidence in the state, the national government should take advantage of the strategic review to strengthen the Fund as public policy. For this to happen, it is essential that the government co-finances international cooperation contributions to the Fund and that national and territorial entities share responsibility in the implementation of its actions and their sustainability.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Relevance

To the Steering Committee:

• Before December 2018 and within the framework of Fase II of the Fund, hold a meeting of the Steering Committee under the leadership of the national government in order to review the focus and strategic prioritization of the Fund.

• Reform the modus operandi of the Fund in order to strengthen the participation of civil society in its strategic direction and the implementation of the projects that it funds.

• Concentrate all the Fund’s limited resources in an integrated way in the municipalities with the greatest risk of instability, promoting financial and political leverage from the corresponding departments and the private sector, including the benefits being awarded to the ZOMAC by the DIAN.

• Position all the Fund’s interventions at the territorial level under a single institutional image that the beneficiary communities can associate with the leadership of the Colombian State and the fulfillment of the peace agreement.

• Create an investment monitoring system at the municipal level, that ensures that the most unstable territories receive investments from the Fund, the departmental governments and the private sector that are proportional with their importance according to their ranking in the risk of instability index, and in so doing ensure maximum cost-efficiency.

• Advocate for the government (national and departmental) to bring forward and increase their investment in the peace building actions of the PDET in order to complement and reinforce the Fund’s impact as the only stabilization instrument in the territories.

Efficiency.

To the Steering Committee:

• Clarify and strengthen the project reviewing and approval and monitoring processes for the Fund at all levels, so that they are in line with its rapid response function. In so doing, bring about a better qualitative balance in the implementation and impact of its actions in accordance with its logical framework.

• Review the appropriateness of designing a logical framework in line with its temporary status as a rapid response post conflict instrument and its contribution to territorial stabilization, and confidence in peace.

To the Technical Secretariat:

• Guarantee the practical implementation of procedures to review and approve projects.

• Establish more fluid and effective communication between the Fund and its implementing civil society partners, as well as effective communication and coordination mechanisms between implementing partners, that do not participate in existing territorial coordination groups.

• Fund and strengthen the systematization of lessons learned, good practices and success stories, as an institutional policy and as a way of continuing to raise awareness about peace by communicating results.

To the Technical Committee:

• Maintain the concept note stage as obligatory with a view to guaranteeing, that approved projects adapt to the conditions in the regions and areas where they are implemented and in all relevant aspects: social, political, temporal and financial.

Efficacy.

To the Steering Committee:

• Update the Fund’s intervention logic for phase II in order to strengthen its impact, sustainability and monitoring and evaluation system.
• Reorganise the donor representation in the Fund’s committees according to the size of investments in order achieve a better balance between financial contribution and decision-making.

• Strengthen the modus operandi of the two committees in order to promote greater civil society participation in the Fund’s Steering Committee and the implementation of the projects.

• Carry out more open calls for proposals for civil society organizations. Ensure that the Technical Secretariat has sufficient capacity in order to act as an initial filter for project proposals and provide feedback, that will improve the quality of the proposals and their gender, environmental and do no harm approaches.

**To the Technical Committee and Secretariat:**

• Always ensure that the concept note is drafted before project approval during the project formulation phase in order to better manage community expectations.

• In order to guarantee the efficacy of project implementation, the Technical Secretariat should ensure, that implementing partners are formulating their proposals at the territorial level (from the bottom up).

**To the Technical Secretariat:**

• Adapt the guidelines that justify the Fund’s crosscutting approaches so that they link their inclusion to the fulfilment of international standards as established in the Sustainable Development Goals.

**Impact.**

**To the Steering Committee:**

• Lobby for the Ministry of Defence, the Integrated Attention and Reparation for Victims Unit and the Territorial Renovation Agency to provide large scale and complementary support to stabilization interventions in the municipalities with the greatest levels of insecurity and victimization, according to the new risk of instability prioritization process.

• Lobby for the State to create a violence monitoring and analysis system in the prioritized high risk of instability municipalities.

• Review the pertinence of investing resources earmarked for rapid response in justice institutions, that require a medium to long-term State strengthening policy.

• Incorporate the design of local base-line studies in the process to prioritize actions and municipalities in phase II of the Fund.

**To the Technical Committee:**

• Include a risk analysis and mitigation strategy for social leaders in municipalities with the highest levels of threats and assassinations as part of the project revision and approval methodology – do no harm.

**Sustainability.**

**To the Steering and Technical Committees:**

• Entry and exit strategies should be included in the project revision and approval process, including the proposal formats.

• From the beginning of the diagnostic phase, all projects should have a sustainability analysis that identifies if they require continuity, leverage and synergy with other potentially complementary action. To that end, there should be regular strategic conversations with other sources of cooperation and territorial entities responsible for PDET implementation.

• Good practices and lessons learned, should be systematized and shared with other projects supported by the Fund and in other regions.
In 2015, during the peace negotiation process between the FARC-EP guerrillas and the government of Colombia in Havana, Cuba, the High Councillor for Post-Conflict began a planning and preparedness process aimed at delivering immediate stabilization impacts in Colombia’s most conflict affected territories.

The UN Multi-donor Post Conflict Fund (hereinafter the Fund) was created in February 2016. Its purpose was to give impetus to the national government’s Rapid Response Strategy within the framework of the Colombia in Peace Fund, together with other international cooperation funds dedicated to building peace once the Final Agreement was signed. The Fund has been fundamental in launching the new institutions created by the government to implement and follow up on the agreements, particularly the bodies needed to provide guarantees to the parties and ensure that the process moves forward. Implementation monitoring is shared between the Follow-up, Impulse, Verification and Implementation of the Final Agreement Commission (CSIVI), composed of representatives of the national government and the FARC, and the Kroc Institute, a think-tank linked to the University of Notre Dame.

The victory of Iván Duque, candidate of the Democratic Centre party in the 2018 presidential elections has created new opportunities to generate a new inter-sectorial consensus on the implementation of the peace agreements. New leadership combined with some specific modifications to satisfy the most sceptical sectors of public opinion, could facilitate a wider acceptance of the agreements. Despite the financial challenges and its different vision for the rural development model to the outgoing government, the new government remains committed to the early implementation of the peace agreements.
3. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The general objective of the mid-term evaluation is to demonstrate how effective the Fund has been in delivering its general objective of providing stability and confidence in peace in the most conflict-affected territories. The evaluation’s analysis will consider that it is an international cooperation instrument that supports the different phases of the national government’s Rapid Response Strategy, and its early implementation of the Final Agreement.

The specific objectives of the evaluation are to:

- Analyse its relevance, alignment and added value (evaluation criterion: Relevance)
- Evaluate the efficiency of its procedures, monitoring and knowledge management (evaluation criterion: Efficiency)
- Determine its effectiveness in achieving objectives and results (evaluation criterion: Effectiveness)
- Analyse the intervention’s impact
- Analyse the sustainability of the Fund’s actions over time
- Identify lessons learned and best practices

Gender equality and environmental sustainability are crosscutting in all the evaluation criteria.

The evaluation anticipated the following:

- Analysis of the work carried out between February 2016 to December 2017 in relation to financial management and up to June 2018, in relation to technical implementation. This takes into account that the UN’s financial calendar ends in December each year.
- Analysis of the Fund’s results to date as a contribution to the state, the post-conflict strategy and international cooperation interests.
- Broad and diverse analysis of opinions from different actors that have participated or are currently participating in the Fund.
- Analysis of crosscutting approaches, disaggregating results information wherever possible.
- Analysis of successful experiences, lessons learned and opportunities for improvement. All of the above, in order to issue recommendations to the Fund’s three stakeholders - the Colombian government, the United Nations and donors - so that it can achieve its final goals more effectively, taking full advantage of the time remaining.
The Fund’s strategy is framed within the guidelines of CONPES 3850 – the Colombia in Peace Fund, established by the Board of Directors of the same and funded by the international community. The Fund is governed by a Steering Committee (government, UN and international cooperation partners), chaired by the High Councillor for Post-Conflict and co-chaired by the United Nations Resident Coordinator, supported by a Technical Secretariat, and administered by the UN Multi-Partner Trust Funds Office in New York. The Fund represents a tripartite alliance between the Colombian government, the UN and bilateral cooperation in order to advance peace stabilization, through the coordination and alignment of rapid response and early Final Agreement implementation objectives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishment date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Fund a response to the stabilisation, planning and early implementation of the peace agreements.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget raised for the Fund up to June 2018</td>
<td>USD 82.9 million from 13 donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget assigned to projects up to June 2013</td>
<td>USD 69.8 million.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project implementers</td>
<td>39 civil society organisations and 11 UN agencies</td>
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Illustration 1. General Fund data. Own elaboration based on TDR

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4 Available at: http://www.funcionpublica.gov.co/eva/es/biblioteca-virtual/paz-y-cambio-cultural/documento_conpes_3850
5 MPTFO. Fund Terms of Reference
6 UK, Canada, PBF, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, WPH, Spain, UAE, Ireland, NZ, Portugal
4.1 FUND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

1. Increase the trust of local communities in the state and local authorities as guarantors of the Rule of Law and as facilitators of a framework of rules and institutions for the democratic and participatory building of territorial peace.

2. Increase confidence in the peace process and its transforming potential to improve the daily lives of people, particularly victims and citizens in the territories most affected by armed conflict and violence.

3. Avoid / mitigate and / or confront criminal phenomena and new outbreaks of violence associated with the armed conflict and demobilization, and reduce the impact of coercion and violence (real and perceived) on people.

4. Manage community or social conflict situations through early interventions that resolve or at least channel social and community demands towards democratic dialogue processes, avoiding the undermining of the peace process’s credibility and implementation.

5. Achieve quick wins in security, justice and development issues, that will permit the timely management of emerging critical events, that could endanger peace.

4.2 RESULTS AND THEMATIC AREAS

The Fund finances projects that prioritize the response through 8 strategic results framed within the 5 objectives set out above. These results are divided into 5 thematic areas. Crosscutting approaches include gender, environmental sustainability, human rights, victims, ethnic minorities, do no harm and the right to participation. The projects supported and financed by the Fund can be analysed according to two intervention approaches:

a. Institutional approach: Projects that promote the new institutional architecture created in the Peace Accords.

b. Territorial approach: Projects that bring peace dividends to the territories most affected by the conflict. Infrastructure construction through local employment, humanitarian demining, improvement in access to basic services such as health, water and sanitation, formalization of PDET and productive environments for the reincorporation of ex-combatants, among others.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN POST CONFLICT MULTIDONIOR TRUST FUND THEORY OF CHANGE</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>THEMATIC AREAS</strong></td>
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<td>-------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transitional justice and reconciliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socio-economic rehabilitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information and communication</td>
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CROSSCUTTING APPROACHES: Gender and environmental sustainability

Illustration 2 Fund Theory of Change. Own elaboration based on ToR
4.3 FUND IMPLEMENTATION STAGES.

In February 2016, the Fund was designed and created in order to implement rapid response actions and early peace agreement implementation in order to bring short and medium stability to the municipalities identified by the government as the most conflict affected. The Fund has passed through 3 important stages since it was created in line with the changing political context:

Stage 1 - Preparedness: February 2016-September 2016:

September 2016: The Fund focuses on strengthening the institutional capacities of the organizations responsible for agreement implementation, strengthening the government’s rapid response strategy, and awareness raising about peace that promotes communication and discussion about peace agreement scope and content.

ACCOMPANYING PEACE IMPLEMENTATION FUND TIME-LINE

Stage 2 - Rapid Response October 2016 - December 2016

On October 2nd, 2016, the referendum on peace is held and the no campaign wins. During this stage the fund focuses on funding demining actions, early reconciliation activities, the strengthening of local justice systems, and continues to build the institutional capacity of organizations responsible for agreement implementation.

Stage 3 - Rapid response and early implementation: January 2017 - June 2018:

Once the Final Agreement with the FARC-EP was signed in December 2016, the Fund focused its actions on the stabilization of vulnerable territories where the presence of the state is strengthening, including the new institutional peace architecture with actions that support the JEP (Special Peace Jurisdiction), CSIVI, reincorporation, among others, and to bring early peace dividends to the populations that most need it.
**Mid Term Evaluation**

- **Jan / August-2017:**

The FARC are in the Local Transitional Normalization Zones (ZVTN). From their initial concentration to final disarmament, the Fund focuses on actions that include: Individual reparation and support to the JEP Secretariat; recruitment prevention; support to enforced disappearance organizations; victims from Bojayá; political reincorporation (CEDIPO); the Selection Committee of the SIVJRNR; and humanitarian demining.

- **Sept 2017 / June 2018:**

The FARC launches its political party in September 2017 and the Fund focuses its support on: International verification mechanisms; socio-economic rehabilitation in the municipalities near to the ETCRs; socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants; humanitarian demining; the Truth Commission; territorial stabilization and support for the PDET; prevention of gender-based violence; support for rural health policy; the demobilization of children and adolescents (phase II); productive reincorporation of former combatants; call for proposals for women’s organizations to participate in peace building, recovery and conflict resolution processes; small infrastructure projects; support to the Missing Persons Search Unit; support to the territorial management of Integrated Action Against Antipersonnel Mines - AICMA; strengthening of the gender focus in the police service; support to the special women’s body for incorporating a gender approach in the agreement; and support to the civil society organizations' window, through which calls for proposals are opened and projects for these organizations are financed.

**ACCOMPANYING PEACE IMPLEMENTATION**

**FUND TIME- LINE STAGE 3**

01

January February 2017: Concentration of FACR-EP in ZVTN.

02

March 2017: FARC: designation of leaders and secretariat.

03


04

September 2017: Launch of FARC as political party

05

June 2018

Illustration 5. Fund timeline – Stage 3

In each of these stages the Fund responded with project funding according to which of the results was most relevant at the time. Figure 6 shows the number of projects approved during each stage and the level of execution up to June 30, 2018. As can be observed, of the 70 projects that were funded by June 2018, 14 were approved in stage 1, 10 in stage 2, and 46 projects in stage 3.
The following illustration shows the percentage of resources approved by result in each stage. The greatest amount of resources was approved during stage 3 for results 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7.
5. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The evaluation took the following United Nations manuals into account: Results Based Management Handbook of the United Nations Development Group (2012), the UNDP Manual for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating Results (2009), and the UNDP Basic Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators (2002).

The following graph outlines the mid-term evaluation methodology in a simplified way. It relates the evaluation questions, strategic criteria and indicators to the Fund’s strategic areas and results that will help identify the findings, recommendations, best practices and lessons learned. The graph demonstrates the evaluation’s emphasis in determining the Funds progress towards the fulfilment of the eight post-conflict stabilization results. The projects that have been supported, managed and financed by the Fund are directly related to one or several of these results.

Although the projects in the field make a direct and explicit contribution to the strategic lines or areas to which they have been allocated, there are several factors based on actions by the Fund that impact directly on their success. These factors relate to the speed of reviewing, approving, and making payments; monitoring and follow-up; providing timely feedback; the coordination of actions between implementing partners, and the coordination between implementing partners and local/ regional governments and communities; the proactive communication of achievements; and the implementation of appropriate entry and exit strategies for each zone, among others.
This following is how the 5 strategic analysis criteria shaped the gathering, organization and processing of information:

1. The relevance of the Fund and its strategic results as a post-conflict rapid response strategy for meeting the needs of communities in the prioritized areas.

2. The efficiency of the Fund’s procedures to facilitate rapid and coordinated action between its key actors: UN, Government of Colombia, civil society organizations involved in territorial project implementation - implementing partners - and project beneficiaries.

3. The effectiveness of the Fund in achieving results as set out in the coordination of actions and the transformation of the regions in which it is intervening.

4. The impact achieved in each region, analysed from the standpoint of each strategic result.

5. And finally, the sustainability of the results and impacts generated, according to territorial authorities, civil society organizations and beneficiary communities.

Each strategic criterion was analysed based on indicators that served to guide the investigative process towards the key documentation and people involved in the implementation of the Fund. To this end, a range of information collection instruments were designed and applied. The first phase of information collection was based on documentary review, complemented afterwards by information gathered from interviews and surveys of key actors. The final analysis of the information resulted in the identification of findings and recommendations organized according to strategic analysis criterion. Some general lessons learned were also identified.

The following are the key strategic actors for the Fund that were consulted during the evaluation:

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Steering Committee: The body that provides overall strategic guidance to the fund and provides general supervisory oversight. Chaired by the High Counsellor for Post-conflict and co-chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator, it is comprised of the following representative members: Government (3); UN (2); donors, on a rotational basis (2); and Colombian private sector or civil society representatives appointed by the President of the Republic (2). The following international organizations participate as observers: World Bank (1); European Union (1); and Inter-American Development Bank (1).

Donors: Financial partners that finance the Fund. These can be governments, public or private institutions, multilateral, inter-governmental or non-governmental organizations or individuals.

Technical secretariat: Provides technical and administrative support to the Steering and Technical Committees and is responsible for organizing the Fund’s project evaluation, monitoring, evaluation and reporting processes, as well as risk management.

UN agencies: These can receive resources from the Fund upon the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding - MOU with the Administrative Agent. UNDP is responsible for the administration of the Funds in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Civil society implementing partners: Non-governmental organizations that can receive support from the Fund to respond to urgent local population needs by signing a MOU with the Managing Agent. They have the operational capacity to immediately implement projects approved by the Steering Committee.

Managing Agent: The Fund Management Agent for the Civil Society Window is UNDP. It is responsible for providing coordination and communication services, administration of resources, monitoring and administration of audits, capacity building, accountability for funds disbursed to the implementing entities and the results achieved.

5.1 CRITERIA AND EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation is based on five strategic criteria: Relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. Each criterion is oriented by a question and grounded by indicators. The following are the evaluation questions (Annex Folder 1, Annex 1.1 Evaluation Questions, Criteria and Indicators):

Evaluation question 1 (EQ 1) To what extent are the interventions of the Fund responding to the needs of the population in the post-conflict territories, adapting to a changing context and providing an added value with respect to other cooperation mechanisms?

EQ 2 Does the Fund have procedures that guarantee efficiency in budget expenditure, the implementation of procedures, the monitoring and follow-up of actions, and knowledge management focused on proposed results achievement?

EQ 3 What is the level of progress on the expected results for the Fund?

EQ 4 Has the Fund generated impacts that have contributed to the stabilization of peace after the signing of the agreement and to Sustainable Development Goal 16 in relation to peace building, the effectiveness of justice systems and the strengthening of territorial institutions?

EQ 5 What strategies and mechanisms have been incorporated to ensure and encourage the sustainability of the interventions?

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8 Operating Manual, page 5
Based on the indicators designed for each evaluation criterion, questions were generated for each indicator in order to provide inputs for the information collection instruments.

Four basic strategies were used to collect information from the different sources: Relevant government institutions, implementing partners, the Technical Secretariat and direct beneficiaries, including community organizations, communities and local governments from areas supported by the Fund.

In the information-gathering matrix, the actors and the information gathering strategy are related according to each strategic evaluation criterion and its indicators. Information gathering strategies and tools were also organised for each type of actor, according to their role and capacity to provide opinions in relation to the evaluation criteria.

The matrices with strategic criteria and indicators, together with the definition of actors to be consulted can be found in the following annexes: Folder 1. Strategic Criteria and Indicators: Annex 1.1 Questions, Criteria and Indicators and Annex 1.2 Information Gathering Matrix.

a. Documentary review and analysis: Key documents produced by the Fund, related government entities, projects implemented in the prioritized areas. The documents that were consulted are referenced in the bibliography of this report.

b. Structured interviews: The mid-term evaluation methodology was commissioned to gather opinions from various key stakeholders who have participated in different ways and at different times in the Fund, and in the implementation of its actions. In general, these include: Government institutions, UN Agencies, civil society organizations (CSOs), that implement projects supported by the Fund, and communities that benefit from the actions.

c. Group interviews with key actors: Strategic spaces that brought together key actors prioritized for the evaluation, according to their roles within the Fund. There were 3 consultative meetings: with donors, with the Technical Secretariat and with civil society organizations that support the implementation of the projects.

d. Surveys: On specific qualitative and quantitative aspects that need to be measured by degree or level of progress. Surveys were prepared for implementing partners and for direct beneficiaries. The surveys were implemented virtually through Google Drive and in person.

All of the evaluation instruments can be consulted in the Annex – Folder 2 Evaluation Instruments.

5.3 EVALUATION PHASES

Para la realización de esta evaluación de medio

Five action phases were structured in order to carry out the evaluation as shown in the following diagram:

The first was the contextualization phase with the Fund and the structuring of the work plan, including a start-up meeting with the Technical Secretariat, documentation review, the organization of the evaluation structure and the design of the information-gathering tools.

The second stage consisted of holding consultative meetings with donors, UN agencies and some implementing partners, as well as interviews with key Fund stakeholders from the UN and the government. During this phase, the evaluators also selected the regions to be visited during the third phase: Antioquia, Cauca, Chocó and Norte de Santander, to carry out interviews with implementing partners, local government and project beneficiaries. These are the regions with the
highest number of selected projects (see section 5.4 Sample of projects for the evaluation). The fourth and fifth phases were dedicated to the organization and analysis of information for the consolidation of the preliminary and final reports. (Annexes: Folder 1 - Evaluation Instruments: List of key actors).

Three key tools were designed, in order to carry out the project visits and can be found in section 4 of the annexes, including the field work report format and the other instruments, that were used to consult with beneficiaries. (Annexes: Folder 1 - Evaluation Instruments: Regional Visit Note, Beneficiaries Survey and Beneficiaries Workshop).

5.4 EVALUATION PROJECT SAMPLE

The following were the criteria that were used to select the projects sample:

1. At least one project per result.
2. An execution level greater than 60% or completed.
3. Different UN and civil society implementing partners.
4. Project implementation zones.
5. Project amount.
6. Project execution dates.
7. Availability of proposal and reporting documentation to be able to carry out the evaluation.
8. The number of projects and the amount assigned per implementer were considered. The designation of funds can be observed in the following chart:

The selected projects are the result of the application of the criteria described above and are representative of the 8 results. Two projects have been chosen from results 4 and 5 because they are the most funded. These projects were mostly executed in the 4 departments chosen by the evaluation: Norte de Santander, Cauca, Antioquia, Chocó and Bogotá (Annex 2.2 List of Selected Projects). The projects chosen by result can be consulted in the Annexes Folder 3 - List of Projects and Selection Criteria. These two instruments can be consulted in detail.
### Illustration 10 Projects and amounts per implementer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing Partner</th>
<th>Amount approved up to June 2018</th>
<th>% Amount Awarded</th>
<th>Amount executed by June 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>329,921</td>
<td>0.48%</td>
<td>221,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>1,351,396</td>
<td>1.98%</td>
<td>2,869,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>10,641,114</td>
<td>15.58%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNWomen</td>
<td>590,184</td>
<td>0.86%</td>
<td>39,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPS/WHO</td>
<td>427,821</td>
<td>0.63%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>458,576</td>
<td>0.67%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>28,132,068</td>
<td>41.19%</td>
<td>16,984,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>18,975,254</td>
<td>27.78%</td>
<td>11,519,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>490,371</td>
<td>0.72%</td>
<td>250,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>2,146,616</td>
<td>3.14%</td>
<td>231,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAS/UNOPS</td>
<td>4,755,852</td>
<td>6.96%</td>
<td>1,414,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>68,299,173</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>33,531,515</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5 EVALUATION TOOLS AND INSTRUMENTS

A few tools were designed for the elaboration of strategic criteria and indicators, including: a questions instrument, criteria and evaluation indicators instrument (Annex 1.1); a data collection matrix (Annex 1.2); and an indicators and findings matrix (Annex 5). In the latter, concrete examples collected from the interviews and surveys can be found.

The following instruments were used in the evaluation: a government interview model (Annex 2.1); a UN interview model (Annex 2.2); a donor workshop model (Annex 2.3); a Technical Secretariat workshop model (Annex 2.4); an implementing partner survey model (Annex 2.5); a beneficiary survey model (Annex 2.6); a beneficiary workshop model (Annex 207); a regional visit note model (Annex 2.8); and a work plan (Annex 2.9).

The information-gathering tools and instruments were used for extracting findings according to each strategic criterion and indicator during both the documentary review, and the different strategic actor consultations in Bogotá and the 4 visited regions. In total, 67 beneficiaries were surveyed. Several were also interviewed, as were 24 representatives of implementing partner organizations. 28 implementing partners also responded to the survey. 8 individual interviews were carried out with government institutions, and another 8 with UN agencies; 5 individual and 3 jointly. In Bogotá, joint interviews were conducted with representatives of 4 donors and 11 implementing partners in 2 different moments; as well as joint interviews with implementing partners during the regional visits.

The documentation relating to answers to interviews and workshops, as well as the database consolidating information gathered from the surveys can be consulted in Annexes - Folder 4: Interviews, Workshops and Surveys.
The following are the mid-term evaluation findings organised according to the analysis carried out for each of the evaluation questions.

6.1 EVALUATION QUESTION 1 - RELEVANCE

EVALUATION QUESTION (EQ 1)

TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE INTERVENTIONS OF THE FUND RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF THE POPULATION IN THE POST-CONFLICT TERRITORIES, ADAPTING TO A CHANGING CONTEXT AND PROVIDING AN ADDED VALUE WITH RESPECT TO OTHER COOPERATION MECHANISMS?

INDICATOR MEASUREMENT SCALE

(P) RELEVANT; (NP) NOT RELEVANT
SATISFACTION LEVEL: HS; S; MS; MI; I; HI
ADAPTABILITY LEVEL: LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS SUMMARY

(R) Relevant Qualification
Principal findings
The Fund’s interventions are relevant and meet the most pressing needs of the post-conflict period, standing out as an ideal rapid response instrument for stabilizing the prioritized territories within the framework of the Colombia in Peace Fund.

(R) Relevant Qualification
The Fund’s interventions have been relevant in relation to its eight outcomes and have demonstrated flexibility and high levels of responsiveness to unanticipated and emerging needs during the rapid response phase. However, the Fund should be reviewed in the light of a new stabilization and agreement implementation context and the priorities of the new national government.

(R) Relevant Qualification
The interventions have added value to the post-conflict framework by quickly implementing stabilization actions in the territories and demonstrating a high capacity to react to emerging situations. High UN capacity contrasts with persistent institutional capacity challenges for meeting territorial population needs, as well as poor levels of civil society and private sector participation in the Fund’s actions.
EC 1.1: Strategic relevance. To what extent are the Fund’s interventions relevant and meet the most pressing needs as a Colombia in Peace Fund instrument in the prioritized territories?

Ind. 1.1.1 At least 75% of respondents (state, donors and CSOs) affirm that the Fund is relevant for meeting urgent post-conflict needs: All of the beneficiaries in the territories and representatives of state institutions, UN agencies and CSOs implementers in Bogotá and the regions affirmed the Fund’s relevance. The interviewees mentioned several factors: 1) the strong territorial presence of its implementing partners and the levels of trust already established with beneficiary communities; 2) its ability to approve projects quickly compared to the state and other sources of international cooperation; and 3) its alignment with the priorities of the national government. In the territories, the implementing partners and direct beneficiaries (communities) and indirect beneficiaries (territorial authorities), confirmed that the Fund responds to the most urgent post-conflict needs. They also confirmed that without the Fund, rapid response actions would not have been implemented due to weak state presence in the prioritized municipalities. Several interlocutors felt that the rapid response strategy contributed to generating confidence in peace among the Fund’s direct beneficiaries, the focusing of resources and the coordination of some early interventions between the state and international cooperation. (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 1. Relevance).

Ind. 1.1.2 Level of satisfaction expressed by interviewed stakeholders (State, donors and UN) with their equitable participation in the Fund’s decision making: Satisfactory: There is consensus that the participation of the different stakeholders was not equal because it was considered appropriate that the national government exercise strategic leadership. Donors, however, could have their opinions heard and influence the final decision making through the discussions that took place in the Steering and above all Technical Committees. In general, the members of the Technical Committee thought that a level of consensus has always been reached, although they did not always agree with the final decision. On some occasions when there were strong disagreements with the government’s proposals, the donors managed to persuade the Fund not to finance them. Some donors and state entities felt that the Office of the High Councillor and / or the Colombia in Peace Fund sometimes imposed their agenda without sufficient strategic justification.

A high-level UN representative expressed the view that the lack of civil society representation in the decision-making mechanisms was an important gap. He added that he would like to see a reform of the project selection process so that the decision-making process would not reflect so much the political positions of its members. The lack of participation by civil society organizations and the need to reinforce the technical rigor of the project selection process was also a concern for donors.

The donors, on the other hand, commented that the proposals of certain agencies were not reviewed with sufficient rigor and that sometimes they were approved due to a sense of fatigue. The donors advocated for more competitive calls for proposals involving civil society organizations and a prior technical filter by thematic experts. This was due to the fact that the Technical Committee has limited capacity and is mainly composed of generalists. Government representatives greatly appreciated that the government was able to make decisions according to the situational needs that were presented. Although the government’s strategic leadership of the Fund was recognized, its articulation with the territories was evidenced. On the other hand, donors also brought their own interests or priorities.

Ind. 1.1.3 At least 75% of the Fund is invested in the municipalities prioritized by DNP: In general, the interviewees expressed satisfaction with the Fund’s targeting because it was based on the methodology of thematic and geographical prioritization agreed in Havana. An investment goal, of 60% territorial, 30% national and 10% flexible, was established. Currently, territorial investment has exceeded the target (67%), despite the need to invest in new peace institutions
at the national level. There was consensus that national level investment was appropriate in order to sustain the peace process and as a complementary strategy to territorial stabilization. The targeting of the projects has coincided in 135 of the 170 PDET municipalities (79%) during a period of 15 months of funding. At the beginning, the Fund was thematically focused according to the national government’s prioritization for early implementation. After the government’s territorial focusing exercise in May 2017, the Fund began to concentrate its investments in the PDET priority municipalities as of the beginning of 2018. The Technical Secretariat and the Presidential Agency for Cooperation (APC), however, did not provide financial evidence for the refocusing in PDET municipalities, because they do not have a detailed analysis of how much the Fund is investing in each municipality by project. In almost all the interviews and surveys, respondents commented that the projects had a significant impact on the lives of direct beneficiaries, but that much more investment is required to cover other needs and in other areas.

Dividing the 67% of the Fund invested in the territories by the 345 municipalities intervened gives an average investment during the two years of execution of only US $ 161,188 per municipality, bearing in mind that the investment in each municipality varied according to the number and type of projects that were implemented in response to needs and priorities in each one. The Fund’s geographically dispersed focus, lack of integration (the projects are implemented as if they were islands without much connection or synergy between them) and disarticulation (especially with local authorities as responsible parties for the intervention sustainability) has generated a high risk of dissipating impact.

EC 1.2: Adaptability. What evidence is there that the Fund’s interventions adapt adequately to changing situations in the post-conflict process?

Ind. 1.2.1 Level of relevance for each Fund according to interviewees (state, donors, UN and CSO): In general terms, the interviewees commented that the theory of change was valid for the planning phase for rapid response. However, it should be reviewed for the new stabilization and agreement implementation situation and in the light of the new national government’s priorities. DNP argued for clearer strategic objectives and instruments that would be able to measure and monitor the impact of the actions supported by the Fund. The government officials and donor representatives that were interviewed did not have a sound knowledge of the Fund’s expected results, suggesting that they have not been important strategic points of reference. Having reviewed them, many commented that most were still valid for stabilization purposes; however, there was no consensus on which, or whether they belonged more to the immediate response actions of the Fund or structural investment by the state. Most commented that their wording is not clear, that there is a lot of overlap between them and that they should be rewritten.

The relative relevance scale for the 8 results in order of relevance according to the average rating of the different stakeholders - partners and Technical Secretariat, donors and government - is as follows (scale of relevance 1-5):

![Strategic partner scoring for Fund results](image)

Illustration 11 Strategic partner relevance scoring for each of the fund results

The disaggregated analysis has produced some findings that are worth noting: 1) There is a notable disagreement between state actors and donors about the relevance of the outcome on victims. While the majority of the state entities qualify 4 or 5, the internationals only 1 or 2, arguing that the scale of the problem is beyond the Fund’s capacity and therefore a state responsibility; 2) APC and the donor representatives see territorial institutional strengthening as of little
relevance for the Fund for the same reason, whereas state actors see it as still very relevant.

**Ind.1.2.2** Degree of response capacity of the Fund (High, Medium, Low) to meet needs that were not contemplated, and in relation to the totality of emerging needs in the implementation period: Almost all the interviewees rated the capacity to respond to needs that were not contemplated and / or emergent as HIGH. Some success factors mentioned include:

1) the Steering and Technical committees were provided with up-to-date information from the High Counsellor for Post-Conflict; 2) the decision makers are in Colombia and have autonomous decision-making power; 3) the high level of understanding and flexibility of donors in relation to post-conflict challenges. In particular, the Fund was able to respond in an agile manner (compared to the state and other cooperation sources) to new needs that were not originally planned. Some examples include: 1) the mobilization of CSOs after the plebiscite; 2) the financing of the new peace building institutions (JEP, CNR, CISIVI, CEV and UBPD); 3) funding of sensitive issues such as the political reincorporation of the FARC-EP and the FARC’s new think tank; and 4) support for the territorial roll out of the ART in order to prepare community agreements and in some cases formulate PDET.

**EC 1.3: Added Value.** How does the Fund’s interventions contribute to a differential and focused approach that makes a specific contribution to post-conflict needs?

**Ind. 1.3.1** The Fund’s interventions are relevant for responding to emerging challenges in relation to gender and women’s empowerment and are aligned with international human rights and environmental protection policies and instruments: Government and donor representatives in Bogota consider that the Fund’s interventions have contributed to territorial stabilization thanks to the rapid deployment of the UN System in comparison to other cooperation sources, its ability to react to new, potentially destabilizing situations, and its effective presence in prioritized territories with early and high impact actions for vulnerable people. However, some high-level state representatives were critical of what they described as the excessive visibility and prominence of the UN System on the ground. A senior official of one of the institutions consulted commented that “you couldn’t tell that the government was also present because the only flag visible was that of the United Nations.” However, despite the creation of an institutional image for post-conflict peace building - Colombia is Reborn - each implementing partner arrives in the territories with its own visibility and institutional identity kits. The "parade of the (institutional) vests" reinforces the perception in the communities that the state does not yet have the capacity or will to attend to their needs.

**Ind. 1.3.2** The contribution of the Fund has been relevant for the stabilization of the regions and for creating confidence in the most vulnerable communities, in relation to other post-conflict funds: The Fund has been able to demonstrate several comparative advantages as a stabilization instrument: 1) it has been flexible, assuming the funding of sensitive issues or those that could not be financed by other funding sources; 2) the response has been much faster than the state or other cooperation mechanisms; 3) it has shown greater understanding of post-conflict challenges and has been able to balance needs at the national (institutional strengthening) and territorial (rapid response) levels; 4) the implementing partners enjoy a high level of recognition and territorial presence; 5) the Fund was able to implement innovative approaches, including working with young people; 6) it has been fundamental for creating order in the cooperation community: It is the first mechanism that has facilitated the mapping and articulation of efforts between donors, the UN and the state. On the other hand, some disadvantages have also been identified: 1) The arrival of the UN and CSO agencies in the territories before the state has reduced its visibility with counterproductive effects in relation to strengthening its image and building trust; 2) The lack of a competitive mechanism that selects projects by comparing
proposals has been used as a justification by donors for doubting the technical quality of some of the projects that have been funded; and 3) the participation of local CSOs in implementation has been restricted compared to the participation of UN agencies, reducing the scope to build trust with civil society actors at the local level.

The evaluation detected some confusion or even scepticism on the part of high-level representatives of implementing partners about the relevance or pertinence of the Fund’s crosscutting approaches. In part this was due to a lack of clarity on how to incorporate them into the project approval process, or their relevance for certain types of projects, especially institutional or very short-term interventions. This was not the case at the territorial level (see effectiveness). Except for gender, the interviews did not provide evidence that the implementing partners considered the crosscutting approaches to be a strategic commitment of great importance to the Fund as part of the UN system, a body that promotes international quality standards. Rather, they are seen as an integral part of their institutional culture or a requirement that needs to be met as part of the project approval process.

6.2 EVALUATION QUESTION 2 - EFFICIENCY

EQ 2

TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE FUND HAVE PROCEDURES THAT GUARANTEE EFFICIENCY IN SPENDING, PROCEDURE IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND FOLLOW UP AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING PROPOSED RESULTS?

ESCALA DE CALIFICACIÓN DE LOS INDICADORES

(AS) HIGHLY SATISFACTORY  
(S) SATISFACTORY  
(MS) MODERATELY SATISFACTORY  
(MI) MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY  
(I) UNSATISFACTORY  
(AI) HIGHLY UNSATISFACTORY
EC2.1: Efficient procedures. What evidence is there, that the Fund has efficient procedures to guarantee the successful implementation of the projects and the achievement of the expected results?

Ind. 2.1.1 The Fund has clear procedures for the revision and approval of projects, that facilitate compliance with the times established in the procedures manual. The Fund has clear procedures established in its operations manual that stipulate the steps and times required by every process. In general, the implementing partners rated the clarity of the procedures and their application as Satisfactory (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 2. Efficiency).

Observations about the improvement of project revision and approval procedures were diverse and directed to all parties: 1) Donors commented that the methodology for the selection of projects was not always fair for the applicant organizations, because in many cases the proposals came to the committee one by one, which did not allow them to compare the quality of the proposals through a competitive process. This issue should be studied carefully to take into account the rapid response nature of the Fund, which does not always allow for this type of structured approach that requires additional time, resources, and procedures, when the response to urgent post-conflict needs requires greater speed and flexibility. 2) The implementing partners presented two clearly differentiated observations in relation to project approval times. The first peace awareness raising projects - before the plebiscite - were revised and approved in a record / extraordinary time compared to the previous experience of implementing partners. The partners who continued in the Fund with further projects commented that the time needed to review and approval proposals and provide feedback increased. Some civil society partners made specific reference to UN Women during the call for proposals process for women’s organizations to receive WHPF Funds. They considered this agency to have wasteful procedures that do not match the needs of post-conflict rapid response. 3) The Technical Secretariat recognizes that the review and approval times have varied. While the first projects were approved with the agility that was required during an emergency period, including greater flexibility without jeopardizing due diligence, the projects that followed experienced delayed response times, further adjustments, etc. In addition, some implementing partners take a long time to make the requested adjustments, extending the expected deadlines further. A recurrent observation was that in some cases the internal procedures of the UN agencies have not been adapted to meet the agility needs of the Fund as a rapid implementation mechanism.

Ind. 2.1.2 The Fund has clear follow-up and monitoring procedures that are applied in a timely manner. The interviewees state that the Fund has clear follow-up and monitoring mechanisms. (See CE 2.2: Follow-up and monitoring)

Ind. 2.1.3 The mobilization and administration of resources is carried out in accordance with the procedures manual and donor requirements and Ind. 2.1.4 Budget execution is in accordance with the established plan: The majority of the implementing partners commented that the budgets agreed with the technical secretaries were sufficient and disbursed quickly. Some civil society partners that operate in difficult to access territories or that are experiencing complex security situations, thought that there was not enough flexibility in the negotiations with their Management Agent in order to accommodate the potential overspends that this type of intervention implies. Overall, the rating for budgetary issues was considered satisfactory. (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 2. Efficiency)

EC 2.2: Follow-up and Monitoring. What evidence is there that the Fund has adequate monitoring and follow-up mechanisms and that they are implemented effectively to achieve the successful implementation of the projects?

Ind. 2.2.1 100% of approved projects have a baseline, objectives, goals and quality indicators: The Fund established clear follow-up and
monitoring mechanisms that align with the objectives and issues of interest: goals achievement, indicator reports and budget execution. The project implementing partners commented that it is highly satisfactory to have this kind of online format, but moderately satisfactory insofar as it is, has limited space and excludes a lot of valuable information. This is an important issue to discuss with project implementers in order to identify which aspects should be incorporated.

The operations manual establishes very specific planning procedures for the project design.

Illustration 12 Efficiency in Fund response to budget execution

Disbursement, execution and reporting phases. All projects therefore include objectives, targets, indicators and monitoring mechanisms. 93% of partners rated this aspect to be between highly satisfactory and satisfactory. The budget is a very precise instrument and is directly related to project objectives, products, activities and indicators.

**Ind. 2.2.2.** Projects that have been implemented have had adequate follow-up mechanisms. Monitoring by management agents during implementation was rated between moderately satisfactory and satisfactory, given that there was little or no feedback on progress reports. This has created uncertainty about how the reports are used as it isn’t clear if they are read and used as a tool for monitoring progress and creating opportunities for improvement; or just an administrative requirement. (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 2. Efficiency). The Technical Secretariat, however, commented that the follow-up tool is being adjusted in order to make better use of the project reports as inputs for the preparation of the annual report and project summaries that are shared with the Technical and Management Committees. The Technical Secretariat was emphatic in the division of responsibilities in relation to monitoring; clarifying that its task is to monitor the projects implemented by UN Agencies, while the Management Agent is responsible for following up on civil society implemented projects.

**EC 2.3:** Knowledge management and coordination. What evidence is there that the Fund has knowledge management and sharing mechanisms, so that project results can be made visible and replicated?

**Ind. 2.3.1** The recommendations of the Technical Committee are timely and have been incorporated efficiently. Civil society partners said that management agent recommendations are incorporated as an obligation but are unaware of their origin or status. It’s also unclear if there is any follow up. They also considered
ibudget execution to be the aspect of Fund Ind.

Ind. 2.3.2 There are efficient mechanisms for managing knowledge and sharing project results: The implementing partners commented that the capturing of best practices and lessons learned is managed through the final report but recommend that this should be a permanent activity as this is not current practice. They also pointed out that monitoring is an integral part of their organizational culture as organizations with experience of working with victims in conflict-affected areas. The systematization of lessons learned, and best practices is therefore a routine exercise that it carried out for both the Fund and other donors. That said, Fund-related systematization seems to be more ad hoc and dependent on the internal standards and practices of the implementing organizations rather than a good practice promoted by the Fund. Systematization is not a requirement for projects, nor is it mentioned in the operational manual. Some partners systematized their work or produced some kind of project document, but with their own resources or those of other donors.

Ind. 2.3.3 The Fund has established efficient partner coordination and articulation mechanisms: The level of coordination or articulation between implementing partners varies greatly. Some commented that territorial coordination with other Fund partners is automatic because they already participate in existing UN and international NGO field coordination mechanisms (thematic clusters, local coordination teams, etc.). Others commented that they did not coordinate with other implementing partners, nor did they have knowledge of other Fund partners in their operational territories. However, they all considered that the Fund should promote the practice so that its projects don’t arrive in the territories in an isolated way but rather exploring potential synergies and complementarities. Implementers of projects related to de-mining and antipersonnel mine prevention thought that coordination should be organized according to thematic area or result.

6.3 EVALUATION QUESTION 3 - EFFICACY.

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EQ 3
TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE FUND ACHIEVED ITS EXPECTED RESULTS, INCLUDING GENDER EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS?

INDICATOR RATING SCALE
(AS) HIGHLY SATISFACTORY
(S) SATISFACTORY
(MS) MODERATELY SATISFACTORY
(MI) MODERATELY SATISFACTORY
(I) UNSATISFACTORY
(AI) HIGHLY SATISFACTORY

KEY FINDINGS SUMMARY

(MS) Moderately satisfactory
Qualification

Key findings
There is a clear need to rethink the Fund’s theory of change, since territorial needs have changed. On average, Fund results have advanced in a moderately satisfactory way. Results 3 and 6 have demonstrated a higher satisfaction level and investment between results varies greatly, especially results 4 and 5. The highest level of execution are represented by results 3, 4, 6 and 8.

(S) Satisfactory
(MS) Moderately satisfactory
Qualification

Key findings
On the one hand, there has been satisfactory progress in the new institutions promoted by the Fund (entities from of the Integral System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition - SIVJRNR, ART and High Councillor for Post-Conflict). The rapid support provided to these institutions has generated confidence in the peace process and is complementary to territorial stabilization. The level of favourability felt by communities towards the effectiveness of the eight results, on the other hand, is moderately satisfactory.
Crosscutting approaches have been incorporated, especially during the design and approval phase. Implementation still requires greater creativity and budgetary allocation for specific actions. The gender approach is being applied with particular rigor in these stages. However, the goal of investing 15% of the total to projects with a gender equity approach has not yet been achieved. In some projects, the application of all the crosscutting issues may be too forced, requiring a degree of revision and prioritization.

**EC 3.1: Progress in results.** To what extent have the results of the Fund advanced, institutions produced positive changes and the theory of change remained valid? Ind. 3.1.1 Level of satisfaction expressed by beneficiaries in relation to progress in the achievement of the result by the project: On the one hand, Fund beneficiaries rated result achievement by their project as highly satisfactory; on the other, they rated the general stability situation of the regions, where the projects were implemented, (see impact) as unsatisfactory (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 3. Efficacy). The responses were as follows:

1. According to Bogota-based interviews, the results should be reviewed and adjusted to current reality (see relevance). The theory of change is not the same as when the Fund started because the needs in the territory have changed.

2. Some of the civil society window projects are unknown in the territories and in several cases the field personnel from the management agent did not have much participation or was completely unaware of the project.

3. The projects contribute to the results, but they are specific actions that require more sustainability and commitment from local authorities. Beneficiaries feel a high level of satisfaction with the results of the projects in which they are directly involved, but they feel that this does not extend to other members of the municipality who are not linked to the projects (see impact).

The following are the general responses of interviewees in relation to the issues that the Fund’s results address:

**R1: Breaking the link between politics and violence:** Moderately unsatisfactory. There are other armed groups in the territory (including some new ones) that are linked to politics.

**R2: Access to Justice:** Moderately satisfactory. 43% of respondents believe that access to justice remains the same or that there has been some improvement. However, many of the interviewees said that there is no confidence in the local justice system in their territories.

**R3: Better perception of security and confidence:** Satisfactory. The communities continue to hope for peace, an improvement in the security situation, greater state presence, and compliance with the agreements. 21% of respondents believe that security is highly unsatisfactory, 10% unsatisfactory, and 18% moderately unsatisfactory. On the other hand, the beneficiaries that were interviewed reported that there was a persistently low level of confidence in security.

**R4 Reparation of Victims:** Highly Satisfactory for beneficiaries of the compensation project (interviewed). Moderately unsatisfactory on the part of the other beneficiaries of the Fund surveyed. In an interview, the beneficiaries of the project “Targeting compensation quotas” (IOM, UNFPA and UARIV) expressed very high satisfaction with the result but added that access to reparation had not improved for the rest of the community.

**R5: Socio-economic and infrastructure rehabilitation:** Moderately unsatisfactory. 61% of the beneficiaries surveyed think that the situation is the same or worse. The people interviewed felt satisfied with the projects and the support received. However, they asked for more accompaniment because when the projects end, they feel alone.

**R6 Institutional capacities:** Satisfactory. It is difficult to reach a general conclusion about the effectiveness of this result due to the
multiple factors that influence project success. Where institutions have the will to participate and contribute, the results can be very positive and the beneficiaries register improvements in institutional response, at least in relation to the implementation of their project (63%). The positive effects, however, do not reach the rest of the community according to the people interviewed in the territory.

**Ind. 3.1.2** Final beneficiary perception regarding positive institutional changes at the municipal and departmental level in areas of intervention: Many surveyed beneficiaries do not feel that the territorial institutions have changed and 33% say that the response capacity of municipal governments remains the same. That said, both interns and the territorial authorities that participated in "Manos a la Paz" reported a significant impact in certain aspects of their capacity due to the actions of this project (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 3 Efficacy, Indicator 3.1.2).

**R7.** Transformation of conflicts: Moderately satisfactory. 28% of respondents feel that there is an improvement in conflict management. The greatest concern in the territories is the recruitment of young people by new armed groups. The civil society organizations that participated in the call for proposals supported by UN Women thought that the projects' impact was very satisfactory, but requested more larger scale, long term projects.

**R8.** Communicating progress in agreement implementation: Highly Unsatisfactory. 61% of respondents say that communication about the peace implementation is the same as or worse than before. Interviewed beneficiaries thought that communication about progress in agreement implementation has been ineffective and that the communication strategy needs to be strengthened at the territorial level.

**Ind. 3.1.5** Result effectiveness in ensuring stabilization and confidence in peace at the territorial level: Fund interventions and budget execution have generally met with their objectives and deadlines. As per the findings in section 3.5, Stages of implementation of the Fund, resources were invested in results according to the different stages of Final Peace Agreement implementation. However, this has resulted in a very unequal investment distribution between the 8 expected results. While 55% of resources have been distributed between results 4 and 5, only 1% has been invested in result 6 as illustrated in the graph below. (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 3. Efficacy)

**Illustration 13 Resource investment by result**
**EC 3.2: Resources used.** To what extent have the institutions created by the Fund advanced and how favourable do the communities feel towards the effectiveness of their eight outcomes?

**Ind. 3.2.1** Percentage of Fund resources allocated and used (earmarked) by result: (see 3.5 Fund implementation stages): The following graph shows the level of beneficiary satisfaction by result by comparing the committed resources of the Technical Secretariat’s data-base and beneficiary satisfaction levels. Result 4 (reparation to victims) represents 25% of the Fund’s resource investment and has a very high satisfaction level amongst direct beneficiaries. Outcome 5 (socio-economic and infrastructure rehabilitation) has the largest share of the Fund’s investment (29% of total resources), but despite this beneficiaries on the whole feel, that the socio-economic situation in their territories remains unchanged, probably due investment levels being very limited in relation to the scale of unmet needs. That said, infrastructure project direct beneficiaries registered high levels of satisfaction in the interviews. Result 7, on the other hand, has also received a favourable opinion from beneficiaries with only a 3% investment. They say that there has been an improvement in the transformation of conflicts (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 3. Efficacy).

**Ind. 3.2.2** Level of progress by the new institutions created by the Fund in relation to objectives set and resources invested: The funding of Institutions of the Integral System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repitition (SIVJRNR, ART and High Counsellor) has been highly satisfactory. The rapid response in this regard has built confidence in the peace process and has been complementary to territorial stabilization efforts. According to the Executive Secretariat of the Special Peace Jurisdiction (hereinafter the JEP), significant progress has been made since this institution was created. The following have been supported: The JEP Executive Secretariat (design and operation)⁹; the operation of the Selection Committee ¹⁰; progress made in the peace agreement; JEP information system design; planning for victim participation in the JEP; and the initiation of the verification process for Projects, Works and Reparation Activities (TOAR) presented to the Executive Secretariat by the FARC. According to data from the Fund’s Technical Secretariat, the JEP already has an allocation of 200,000 million COP from the general national budget for 2018. Equally, the Truth Commission was formally installed in August 2018 with 130 employees, and has an allocated budget of 81,000 million COP. The Commission itself considers that “The progress has been highly satisfactory because the funding provided by the Multi-donor Fund has been given in a coordinated and stable manner from the outset,”

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⁹ According to the Executive Secretariat “The first component of the operating entity was the Executive Secretariat, which operated with resources from the Canadian government, with which the hiring of the first work team was carried out (January 15 to April 30, 2017), consisting of 20 contractors and 3 external consultants. Subsequently, with resources from the Multi-donor Fund, the second team (from July 2017 to January 2018) started up with 81 contractors [UNDP and OIM].”

¹⁰ The support to the selection committee was to select 51 magistrates (incumbents and substitutes), the director of the UIA and the Executive Secretary, all of whom took office in the first months of 2018.
allowing the Commission to carry out its preparedness and implementation activities. Thanks to this, it has had resources it needed to begin functioning.” Finally, the Unit for Disappeared Persons (UBPD)\(^\text{11}\) which was also supported by the Fund, was officially established in August and has already received a budget allocation from the Ministry of Finance, including for its staff. (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 3. Efficacy).

**EC 3.3: Cross-cutting issues.** How have cross-cutting issues been incorporated and implemented in the Fund’s interventions? Ind. 3.3.1 Level of incorporation of cross-cutting approaches in implemented projects: 50% of the people surveyed felt that the implementation of cross-cutting issues was Moderately Satisfactory. All the projects incorporate cross-cutting issues according to the proposals format, with gender as mandatory. In addition, the Technical Committee had the necessary technical advice to implement the gender approach in a rigorous manner, including the application of an incorporation evaluation marker during the approval and adjustment stage. This strategy was considered very important by the interviewees in Bogotá. As for the goal of investing 15% of the total in gender equity projects, the Fund had invested and / or committed resources equivalent to 12% as of June 30, 2018 (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 3. Efficacy, Indicator 3.3.1).

**Ind. 3.3.2** Level of satisfaction of the communities impacted by the projects on changes in relation to the following cross-cutting issues: Both in Cauca and in Chocó, the implementing partners and the beneficiaries felt that the Fund’s cross-cutting approaches had been applied and added value to project implementation. Beneficiaries felt that the projects took the particular needs of women and, where appropriate, indigenous and Afro Colombian people into account. Female beneficiaries thought that their participation in the projects was equitable with that of men and that this resulted a significant degree of empowerment. The exception was the inclusion of indigenous women and girls. According to the implementing partners consulted, this would require a culturally specific and much longer-term approach.

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\(^{11}\) Decree 1393 of 6 August 2018, established the structure of the UBPD.

### 6.4 EVALUATION QUESTION 4 - IMPACT

**EQ 4**

To what extent has the Fund generated effects that have contributed to peace stabilization after the signing of the Agreement and to SDG 16 in relation to peace building, the effectiveness of the justice system and the strengthening of territorial institutions?

**INDICATOR RATING SCALE**

(5) MUCH BETTER  
(4) BETTER  
(3) NO CHANGE  
(2) WORSE  
(1) MUCH WORSE

**KEY FINDINGS SUMMARY**

(3) No change  

**Key findings**

By prior agreement between the government, the UN and donors, the Fund does not have its own baseline study or monitoring and evaluation system with indicators to measure changes in beneficiary perception in a statistically reliable way. This is because it would use the Rapid Response Strategy system. This means that the impact of the Fund cannot be measured in terms of: i) Perception of the security situation, ii) confidence in local justice systems, and iii) the capacity for engaging in social dialogue and conflict prevention. Also, the state does not have national and territorial level statistics that would allow for the measurement of these variables.

**Between:** (6) Much better  
(some victim beneficiaries of psychosocial support)  
(3) No change (the great majority)  
(2) Worse (especially in areas where the security situation has deteriorated)

**Key findings**

The perception of confidence expressed by the beneficiaries in general about the implementation of the agreements has not changed, although
interviewees said that they feel much more optimistic as a result of being project beneficiaries. The persistent pessimism expressed by the majority is due to factors outside the scope and control of the Fund and therefore should not be interpreted as a lack of impact by this instrument. Additionally, the perception of security is not homogeneous and depends on the particularities of post-conflict that emerge in each context.

**Qualification**

(3) No change

**Key findings**

The level of confidence expressed in local justice systems depends in each case on the local municipal context, including the commitment of the current administration and the level of resources available for this type of services. Determining factors for the good performance of territorial justice systems seem to depend on structural factors that are beyond the scope of the Fund as a short-term stabilization instrument. The local justice systems that work best and enjoy the highest level of confidence are in municipalities with a high level of social organization and cohesion.

**Between: (4) Better (3) No change**

**Key findings**

Territorial institutions have been strengthened in municipalities where the Fund has specifically supported territorial entities and / or the Fund could demonstrate its impact as a catalyst and / or there are mayors or mayoresses, who are committed to peace building. The response capacity of territorial entities is still seriously affected by determining success factors beyond the scope of the Fund: 1) The political will of the current administration; and 2) budget capacity for local authorities to co-finance or follow up on implemented actions.

**EC 4.1: Confidence in peace.** How much confidence does the public express in the implementation of the peace agreements and to what extent do they perceive that the security situation has stabilized or improved?

**Ind. 4.1.1 Level of confidence expressed by citizens in the implementation of the peace agreements (outcome 8):** During the creation of the Fund, the government, the UN and donors agreed that the Fund does not have the responsibility, scope or resources in order to create and maintain its own baseline and monitoring and evaluation system with indicators at the national level. Instead, it would take advantage of the system created by the national government’s Rapid Response Strategy. Although the system was created, measurements were never taken at the national level in order to put into operation. It is, therefore, not possible to measure the impact of the Fund through changes in beneficiary perception in a statistically reliable manner, as foreseen by the battery of indicators created for the Rapid Response Strategy.

Bearing in mind the Fund’s limited responsibility and scope in this respect, beneficiary interviews and surveys indicate that their perception of confidence in the implementation of the agreements has generally not improved due to the lack of state investment and presence. The beneficiaries of the accelerated reparation and psychosocial support projects, however, expressed much more optimism. The persistent pessimism is therefore due to factors that go beyond the Fund’s influencing and impact capacity, including: 1) The predominant presence of international cooperation in stabilization interventions has perpetuated the perception of state absence (including its limited articulation at the local level with Fund interventions). At the same time this has generated a persistent distrust in its capacity and willingness to respond adequately to the urgent needs of the prioritized territories [see effectiveness of the results]; 2) the low confidence expressed in the security situation, related to the arrival of new armed actors following the FARC-EP demobilization process, the uncertainty associated with the election of the new government, and general fears about the stability of the territories due to the presence of illicit economies; 3) the limited investment in complementary stabilization actions by the state; and 4) lack of effective communication about progress in peace agreement implementation; amongst others. (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 4. Impact, EC 4.1 Confidence in Peace).

**Ind. 4.1.2 Perception of citizens about changes in the security situation (Result 3):** There are also no statistics related to changes in the level of citizen confidence about the security situation. However, interviews and surveys demonstrate that perceptions about security are not homogeneous and vary according to each context. The justifications given by beneficiaries for their perceptions reveal three basic security scenarios in the municipalities where the Fund operates: 1) The security conditions are worse because new actors have
entered to dispute social and territorial control (particularly ELN and dissident groups), including an increase of the murder of social leaders; 2) the level of insecurity remains the same, but people are noticing new factors for instability such as common crime and a greater trafficking and consumption of drugs, amongst others. These dynamics were previously controlled by the FARC-EP and have not been effectively brought under control by the state; and 3) the security situation has improved and there is a greater degree of calm and mobility, but there is no confidence in the capacity of the security forces to prevent the entry of new armed actors and control illicit economies (illicit crops, mining illegal, etc.) in order to counter the factors that generate insecurity. The beneficiaries also expressed concern about the vulnerability of young people to armed actor recruitment due to the lack of viable economic alternatives. They also said that the security forces are afraid to enter certain sectors, or that the communities are afraid of them entering, evidencing the clear distrust between the parties (Bojayá). The testimony of a victim from Toribio, Cauca, summarizes the perception of many beneficiaries about safety, despite the stabilization efforts: “It is necessary that the whole community gets support in psychological issues. People are distrustful again after the change of presidency. Until last week, Caloto, Corinto, Toribio and Jambaló experienced energy supply shortages for a week and there is still no solution. This is due to crime, the presence of dissidents, so it feels like the war is coming back. They keep the planes and helicopters flying over and people are afraid that the violence will return, so we ask for psychological support so that the population can live in peace again. We have not seen this accompaniment so far. And productive projects are also needed to replace illegal crops. Young people should be kept busy to prevent them joining the illegal armed groups.”

EC 4.2: Effectiveness of the justice system. Is the local justice system adequately managing social conflicts and is there a reduction in acts of violence associated with the armed conflict?

Ind. 4.2.1 Level of confidence expressed by citizens in the adequacy of local justice systems as effective conflict management mechanisms (result 3): The variety of responses means that it is not possible to reach a conclusion about the Fund’s impact on the quality of the state’s conflict resolution services at the local. Although, 24% thought that the level had improved (4). 19% thought that there was no change (3) and the same percentage of people thought that it was much worse (1). According to the interviews, confidence in local justice systems mostly depends on the local context in each municipality, including the commitment of current administrations and the level of resources available for this type of service. Some commented that even in cases where there was good will on the part of local officials, they did not have sufficient resources to manage their case load; others commented that there was no commitment or interest because the local justice officials (personeros) were “bureaucratic quotas”. These factors are beyond the scope of the Fund to resolve as a short-term stabilization instrument. The local justice systems that work best and enjoy the highest level of confidence are in municipalities that have a high degree of social organization. In these cases, the communities operate their own alternative justice systems (for example indigenous communities) or have taken a collective decision to use local state mechanisms to resolve their conflicts, even if they are not always effective (as in the municipality of Cármen de Atrato).

Ind. 4.2.2. The incidence of violent and / or conflictive acts related to the armed conflict has stabilized in the municipalities where the Fund has intervened in comparison with other municipalities (results 1 and 2): It is not possible to evaluate the impact of the Fund in strengthening local judicial and conflict prevention systems since there is no baseline nor monitoring system that tracks these phenomena in the prioritized municipalities. The National Police and the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office (Defensoría del Pueblo) maintain databases with up-to-date statistics at the municipal level and UNDSS compares information from several databases to perform security analyses for the UN at the national level.

The evaluation made several information requests to the UNDSS analysis team to find out if the violence trends in the intervened municipalities had changed in the last two years in comparison with non-prioritized municipalities. However, the analysis provided was based on national level analysis and as such could not be used to verify incidence of violence trends in the municipalities where the Fund had intervened. The information collected and analysed by UNDSS is undoubtedly an important resource for the Fund, but the entity that should be responsible for statistical monitoring of conflict and violence trends is High Counsellor for Post-conflict (Alta Consejería para el Posconflicto).

Ind. 4.2.3. The murder of social leaders is lower in the municipalities intervened compared to other municipalities (result 3): Many people interviewed by the evaluation mentioned that the murder of community leaders in their territories as one of the main reasons why their confidence in the security situation has not improved. Given their importance in promoting social
dialogue between the communities and the state, the aggressions against them have a disproportionate impact on social cohesion and confidence in peace. During the period under evaluation, the Fund did not finance any projects aimed at the protection of social leaders. Nor did it establish a system for monitoring aggressions against them in the prioritized municipalities.

According to the statistics from the Human Rights Ombudsman, between January 1, 2016 and July 26, 2018 (dates that coincide largely with the period of implementation of the Fund under evaluation), 330 social leaders and human rights defenders were murdered in Colombia. The highest number of homicides occurred in the departments of Cauca: 81, followed by Antioquia: 47, Norte de Santander: 20, Nariño: 19, Valle del Cauca: 18, and Chocó: 17.Four of these most critical departments were visited by the evaluation and three occupy the first places in the murder rate ranking. According to the Kroc Institute: "The security and protection guarantees for social leaders in the territories are of the utmost importance for encouraging community participation in the implementation [of the agreements]. It is imperative to strengthen the territorial deployment of protection and security measures, as well as include cross-cutting and differential approaches for different population groups in security and protection measures."

**EC 4.3: Strengthened local institutions.** Have territorial institutions been sufficiently strengthened to the point that the citizens most affected by the armed conflict perceive that they have the capacity to adequately respond to their most urgent needs in the post-conflict period?

**Ind. 4.3.1.** The municipalities intervened by the Fund have a higher level of individual and collective reparation, compared to other municipalities (result 4): The interviews with victim beneficiaries demonstrated that the Fund had had a significant impact in accelerating their reparation, both individually and collectively. The beneficiaries said that they were either satisfied or highly satisfied with the psychosocial support and the speed of their reparation processes thanks to the partnership between the UARIV and the joint IOM-UNFPA project at the territorial level. However, beneficiaries of the reparation projects felt that only the processes of the people that had been prioritized by the UARIV had been accelerated. There had been no improvement for the rest of the victim population in their municipality, because they depended exclusively on municipal services, although some beneficiaries said that they had started advising other victims on their own initiative. To clarify this anecdotal evidence, the reevaluation made several requests for information to the UARIV in Bogotá in order to obtain comparative information at the municipal level that could shed light on the impact on institutional capacity through statistical analysis. This information was not forthcoming.

**Ind. 4.3.2.** The institutional performance of the intervened municipalities has improved (Result 6): Beneficiary perception about the capacity of municipalities to respond to their most pressing needs remains unchanged (39%), worse or much worse (33%); and better or much better (28%). However, when asked about the capacity of the local authorities in relation to the project, the perception changes positively: 64% believe that the capacity has improved, versus 24% who say that they have not improved and 13% who do not know. The assumption is that the difference between the two perceptions is due in part to the positive impact that the Fund’s interventions have had on the image of local authorities because of their direct association or involvement in the projects. In any case, the positive effect does not seem to extend beyond the scope of the projects due to the persistent negative perception about the capacity of territorial authorities to respond to pressing needs in general (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 4. Impact, Indicators 4.3.1 and 4.3.2).

**Ind. 4.3.3** Level of satisfaction expressed by citizens in relation to the capacity of their municipality to respond to the most urgent needs of post-conflict as a result of the project (Results 5 and 7): As expressed in interview, the perception of improvement is greater in the municipalities where the Fund has provided specific support to local authorities and / or there are mayors committed to peace building. Manos a la Paz, for example, was highly valued by the municipal authorities in Santa Rosa (Cauca) because of the focused and timely support that the young professionals given to the stabilization effort in the municipality. In this case, the Fund demonstrated impact as a catalysing agent: “The interns carried out diagnostic analysis; which was something that favoured us institutionally because they provided us with support in issues where we did not have a budget [to carry out that work]. This allowed us to discover more about the territory and establish our work goals. This resulted in an articulated effort and the perception of local people that the local administration had facilitated these new dynamics.” ¹³

¹² Human Rights Ombudsman, “Murders of Social Leaders and HR Defenders”, July 27, 2018
¹³ Government Secretary, Santa Rosa
participate in stabilization interventions: "These are the kinds of actions that increase people’s confidence. There was a lot of scepticism because people thought that everything was just on paper, but when they see high impact public works it generates credibility in the process. In the areas where the projects have generated greatest impact, people have become more interested in being part of the peace agreement processes. This has been affected by the government’s lack of compliance, particularly in relation to illicit crop substitution." 14 The departmental government in Chocó greatly appreciated the support of the Manos a la Paz interns who also supported the strengthening of cooperation roundtables and platforms to mobilize young people. "There is a lot of documentation that is now a solid foundation for us and evidence of their contribution. This is what will help us to move forward on many things. It was very dynamic. They had a lot of initiative and enthusiasm.”

However, both direct beneficiaries and indirect beneficiaries (local authority officials) commented that the Fund’s interventions were too limited and that the response capacity of the territorial institutions was still seriously affected by factors that are beyond the impact scope of the Fund: 1) The importance of local administrations’ political will as a determining success factor; and 2) the availability of budgets with which mayors can co-finance or follow up on the actions.

### 6.5 EVALUATION QUESTION 5 – SUSTAINABILITY

**EQ 5**

**WHAT STRATEGIES AND MECHANISMS HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE AND ENSURE THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE INTERVENTIONS?**

**INDICATOR RATING SCALE**

(S) SUSTAINABLE  
(U) UNSUSTAINABLE  
(TO) TOO EARLY TO GIVE AN OPINION

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**KEY FINDINGS SUMMARY**

**S) Sustainable and (U) Unsustainable**  
**Qualification**

**Key findings**

Not all Fund actions in the territories have the following: 1) A clear entry and exit strategy; 2) synergies between Fund interventions and with other actions in the territory; and 3) the capacity to replicate and scale up. Some institutions do have this type of strategy (for example the SIVJRNR) and the intervention protocols of the demining organizations.

**S) Sustainable and (U) Unsustainable**  
**Qualification**

**Key findings**

Good practices and lessons learned are mentioned in the project reports, but there is no systematization and analysis strategy apart from the annual report. Little is shared and applied in other interventions.

**Between: (S) Sustainable and (U) Unsustainable**  
**Qualification**

**Key findings**

Not all Fund actions in the territories have the following: 1) A clear entry and exit strategy; 2) synergies between Fund interventions and with other actions in the territory; and 3) the capacity to replicate and scale up. Some institutions do have this type of strategy (for example the SIVJRNR) and the intervention protocols of the demining organizations.

**S) Sustainable**  
**Qualification**

**Key findings**

ONUMUJERES plays a very important role as a technical expert in gender issues and the projects they implement have a very high level of community ownership. Cross cutting approaches are generally sustainable.

**EC 5.1: Sustainability strategies and mechanisms. Do Fund interventions have input and output strategies and mechanisms for intervention sustainability?**

**Ind. 5.1.1 Projects incorporate entry and exit strategies to ensure that they comply with Do no Harm principles: Implementing partners that were interviewed said that this is not a priority and not all organizations have entry and exit strategies. In other**

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14 Ibid.  
15 Cooperation Secretary, Chocó Departmental Government
words, the existence and fulfillment of these strategies depends on the implementing partner. For example, according to the interviews, several of the exit strategies comprised of closing and awareness raising events with beneficiary communities to present an overview of the implementation of the project. For actions such as humanitarian demining, collective and individual reparation and recruitment prevention there are protocols that involve local authorities. Entry strategies follow protocols aimed at informing, obtaining information, planning activities, obtaining permits (infrastructure), but this does not imply a strategy for linking local governments to the implementation of the project.

A Do no Harm risk has been identified in cases where there is no clear entry and exit strategy because there is no plan to adequately manage community expectations and / or guarantee intervention continuity via jointly defined agreements with stakeholders (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 5. Sustainability).

Ind. 5.1.2 Perception around the generation of synergies and / or replicability and / or project scale up: The Fund requires all implementing partners to work with government counterparts. Although it does not apply in all actions, in some cases such as “Manos a la Obra” infrastructure projects (Cauca), handovers took place with local authorities and the bridge construction model was replicated in similar public works projects.

There are also actions in which government institutions are directly linked and provide assistance. For example, IOM, UNFPA and UARIV have a strategy, that has been very coordinated at the territorial level in different regions through a good operational alliance, and that has achieved co-financing from both parties. At the national level there is a high level of ownership by institutions such as the SIVJRNR. Although the Fund requires proposals to explain how synergies are going to be developed, especially with government bodies, there is a need for greater coordination between partners and their projects. Interviewees suggested that the Technical Secretariat should play a coordinating role to promote synergies in the territories from within the Fund. (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 5. Sustainability).

Ind. 5.1.3 Level of good practice incorporation to achieve project sustainability: Although the implementers in the territory know about other Fund interventions, there is a minimal degree of programmatic/informational integration between them and have some initiatives under way to replicate and / or scale up interventions. Some UN implementing partners indicated that they do not feel there is a clear strategy to leveraging resources, although many of the projects continue to be funded with state resources. (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 5. Sustainability).

EC 5.2: Good practices and lessons learned. Do the projects have good practices and lessons learned to be replicated as part of the sustainability of the action?

Ind. 5.2.1 Level of incorporation of good practices to achieve project sustainability and Ind. 5.2.2 Level of incorporation of lessons learned to achieve project sustainability: According to the interviewees, the level of incorporation of good practices and lessons learned is reasonable for achieving project sustainability. Although some of this is done through the project reports, the interviewees indicated that they do not have a method for collecting, systematizing and analysing information. That is the reason why very little or no information is shared and applied in other projects or regions.

The Technical Secretariat commented that up to this point it had been too early to carry out this kind of task and that now is the right time to make a start. On the other hand, implementing partners agree that good practices and lessons learned should be made more visible and that the Fund should promote them more strategically. They think that their inclusion in the annual report is insufficient. Up until now the incorporation of these practices has depended entirely on the interest of the implementer, its organizational culture and the project. (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 5. Sustainability).

EC 5.3: Cross-cutting issues. To what extent have communities taken ownership of Fund interventions, including its crosscutting approaches?

Ind. 5.3.1 Level of ownership adopted by communities and local institutions once Fund actions cease: Most of the beneficiaries interviewed agree that the communities take ownership of Fund interventions. For example, in most infrastructure projects in Cauca, Norte de Santander and Antioquia, it is the community that is responsible for maintenance and continuing
with further public works. This is not so with the territorial institutions. In many cases they do not even participate in the action. Another example of local ownership is the community house that was built in Cármen de Atrato. In this case, the JAC has assumed responsibility for maintaining the house and the community for supplying manual labour. The projects that respond the best to community prioritized needs are those where civil society is the most organized. Evidence of project sustainability is highest where mayors are most active (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 5. Sustainability).

**Ind. 5.3.2** Level of integration of actions, including cross-cutting approaches, by strengthened institutions: The beneficiaries responded positively by taking ownership of cross-cutting issues, bearing in mind that all the projects include at least one approach and that gender is an obligatory issue.

UNWomen plays a very important role as technical expert in gender issues and the projects implemented through the "Participation of women in processes of peace building, recovery and conflict resolution" call, have a very high level of community ownership (Annexes: Folder 5 Matrix Criteria, Indicators and Findings - 5. Sustainability).

![Illustration 15](image-url)Results sustainability in regions – beneficiary survey
7. RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 RELATING TO THE RELEVANCE AND VALUE ADDED OF THE FUND.

To the Steering Committee:

- Before December 2018, and within the framework of Phase II of the Fund, organize a meeting of the Steering Committee under the leadership of the national government to review the strategic focus and prioritization of the Fund. It is important that the strategic review analyse and discuss the findings and recommendations of the midterm evaluation, especially the need to clarify the strategic scope of the Fund and the articulation of its interventions with public policy. The committee should explore the differing opinions of donors and the national government on the prioritization of the Fund’s expected results as a stabilization instrument. Given its limited budget, the committee should seek consensus on which of the results are stabilization quick wins and therefore possible within the scope of the Fund, and which belong to medium-term implementation of the agreements, exclusive responsibility of the State.

- Reform the modus operandi of the Fund in order to strengthen civil society participation in strategic orientation and implementation. Review and update the Fund’s strategic decision-making protocol in the Steering Committee, as well as for the reviewing and selection of projects in the Technical Committee. The protocol should clarify and justify each actor’s role in the decision-making process and create a mechanism for the transparent communication of decisions made. Two face-to-face consultative meetings of the Steering Committee should be scheduled each year under the leadership of the national government in order to analyse the Fund’s context and strategic direction. Two new permanent Steering Committee representatives should be chosen: one from the private sector and one from the CSO sector. This representation will ensure that strategic decision-making is legitimized by taking civil society viewpoints into consideration. The Technical Committee should strengthen its capacity to involve civil society organizations, hiring the services of thematic experts to filter and channel the best project proposals for review and approval (see effectiveness).

- Concentrate all the Fund’s limited resources in an integrated way in the municipalities at greatest risk of instability. In conjunction with DNP, the committee should identify the 40 PDET municipalities that pose the greatest threat to post-conflict stability, due to their increased risk of relapsing into armed conflict and / or organized crime dynamics. The refocusing should be guided by an index that is composed of indicators related exclusively to the risk of instability. Through calls for proposals that are open to CSOs, UN agencies and state entities, the Fund should channel integrated interventions to the most critical municipalities according to their index ranking, prioritizing those proposals with the greatest synergy and sustainability generating potential. The Fund should maintain a percentage of its resources unearmarked in order to
continue reacting to emerging situations, including unforeseen and complementary actions at the national level. This review should take advantage of the tax benefits offered by the National Tax and Customs Office (DIAN) for inward investment and business start-ups in the Areas Most Affected by the Armed Conflict (ZOMAC).

- **All Fund interventions at the territorial level should be positioned under a single identity that beneficiary communities can associate with the Colombian State’s leadership and peace agreement compliance.** The Steering Committee should set aside 0.4% of the global budget to promote the Fund as an integrated state strategy in the territories. The committee should appoint a high-level communications director who would report directly to the Co-Chairs of the Fund, and in so doing, ensure that the communications strategy is aligned with Steering Committee priorities. The director should design the strategy and be responsible for its appropriation and implementation by all Fund partners and interest groups. To accommodate the visibility needs of the different interest groups, the strategy should adopt a differential approach between the territorial and national level (where the state’s image and leadership would be emphasized in order to build trust), and the international level (where the role of the UN and donor countries would be promoted in order to motivate cooperation contributions).

- **Create an investment monitoring system at the municipal level to ensure that the most unstable territories receive investments from the Fund that are proportional to their importance according to the instability risk index, ensuring greater cost-effectiveness of the investment.** Based on the level of investment of the Fund in phase I, a new targeting based on the 40 most critical municipalities, would result in an average investment per municipality of US $ 1.4 million in phase II. If the national government, regional local authorities and the private sector co-financed all the projects, the average amount per municipality would total almost US $ 3 million. If funding were distributed according to the risk of instability ranking, the Fund could focus much larger amounts on the “hot spots” and immediately contain their contagious effect towards other territories.

- **Advocate for departmental and national governments to bring forward and increase their investment in PDET peace building actions in order to reinforce and complement the Fund’s impact as the only stabilization instrument in the territories.** The Fund needs to be reinforced by an immediate state presence in the most critical municipalities with investments that complement its stabilization interventions. To be recognized in the territories as the strategic leader of the Fund, the national government should co-finance all of its stabilization projects. A significant amount of these funds should be assigned to territorial authorities and decentralized national entities so that they can take ownership of the projects and guarantee their sustainability. To guarantee the effectiveness of the strategy and motivate donors to continue contributing to the Fund, the national government should provide matching funds that are equivalent to the combined investment of contributing countries. That is, for every peso invested by international cooperation, the Colombian government should commit a peso from the national budget: an amount equivalent to approximately 0.1% of annual public expenditure. To increase the scope of the Fund, these government funds should be additional and not contributions in kind.

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14 See recommendation No. 2, Annual Report 2016
15 The precise amounts in each municipality in phase II will depend on the decisions made by the Steering Committee, in light of these recommendations and the investment prioritization resulting from the risk of instability index analysis. The average amounts indicated here are merely illustrative to show how much the Fund’s investment could be increased on average in each municipality through a refocusing process.
16 Based on 2016 figures.
7.2 RELATING TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FUND’S PROCEDURES, RESPONSE CAPACITY AND MANAGEMENT.

To the Steering Committee:

• Clarify and strengthen the Fund’s monitoring and follow-up processes at all levels. Strengthen the Fund’s monitoring and follow-up system in order to achieve a greater qualitative equilibrium between its different actions, their level of progress, and impact, according to the logical framework on which its interventions have been based to date; or build a specific logical framework for the Fund, which would allow it to measure real impact in project implementation areas. Make adjustments aimed at achieving expected results with the same level of commitment and dedication as budget monitoring and administrative compliance.

• Review Technical Committee membership in order to strengthen its representational capacity, reducing the number of participants if necessary. This revision would create greater efficiency and effectiveness, reducing the number of divergent opinions that make decision-making difficult.

To the Technical Secretariat:

• Review the way in which the project review and approval process is being carried out in practice. This in order to meet the times established for reviewing and approving projects in the procedures manual, including the need to achieve a more competitive project selection strategy.

• Establish more fluid and effective communication mechanisms between the Fund and civil society implementing partners. To strengthen the coordination and communication flow between the Technical Secretariat, management agents and civil society implementing partners, it is necessary to: (i) Carry out more consultation with management agents and implementing partners in order to review the efficiency of implementation processes, including the type and quality of information required and at what intervals; (ii) Design a monitoring and follow-up protocol to be applied by management agents that is focused on providing more and better qualitative feedback to implementing partners on the content of their reports. (iii) A strategy for civil society implementing partners to be better informed about the Steering Committee’s strategic decisions, contextualized in relation to the Fund’s actions at the national level via access to Steering Committee minutes published in Google Drive.

• Establish communication and coordination mechanisms between implementing partners that do not participate in existing territorial coordination groups. The greater focusing of the Fund through Territorial Stabilization Plans (1. Relevance) would substantially improve coordination between organizations that are not already linked through other mechanisms. One way to achieve greater impact and sustainability at the territorial level would be for implementing partners to be aware of each other (the presence of other implementing entities, their projects and contact information of responsible actors) in order to coordinate actions, share information, carry out joint monitoring, etc. Implementing partners proposed coordination according to thematic areas and / or the expected results to which their projects contribute. The Fund could allocate resources from the communications strategy to this end either via individual projects or at a regional level (2. Relevance), and in so doing, promote greater coordination and dialogue between different actions by geographical zones.

• Fund and strengthen the systematization of lessons learned, good practices and Fund success stories as an institutional policy. Assign budget lines to cover the costs of project systematization through the Fund’s communication strategy (see relevance). The documentation of lessons learned and good practices, should serve to create an implementing partners learning community. This activity could be financed by the Fund or as in-kind co-financing by implementing partners since several are already doing so on their own initiative. The systematization of high impact experiences would help to communicate the Fund’s progress to external audiences, especially for fundraising at the national and international level (see sustainability).

To the Technical Committee:

• Guarantee the efficiency of project review and approval procedures (3. Efficacy), making the initial concept note approval stage obligatory. This tool creates an opportunity to qualify projects during the design phase so that needs identification, planning
and prioritization can be adjusted to territorial realities. The concept note also streamlines the process by giving implementing partners the opportunity to define their baselines, objectives, results and detailed budgets for the final proposal based on real research in the field.

7.3 RELATING TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FUND IN ACHIEVING ITS OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIZED RESULTS.

To the Steering Committee:

• Update the Fund’s logical framework for the second phase to strengthen its impact, sustainability and monitoring and evaluation system (see relevance). A new logical framework and municipal focus for the Fund should be based on the diagnosis of the risk of instability index indicators and the conclusions of the strategic review meeting (see relevance). The analysis should include an evaluation of the cost effectiveness of the logical framework by result. The new logical framework and targeting would ensure that: 1) The Fund’s interventions focus on the municipalities considered to be most critical for stabilization; 2) the Fund generates alliances between state and non-state partners to maximize added value and sustainability; and 3) the Fund includes a monitoring and evaluation system with the capacity to measure the project impact at the local level and their direct contribution to the strategic objectives of the Fund. Given the importance of changing perception in confidence building, the baseline should combine a mix of objective indicators (levels of violence, presence of illicit crops, etc.) with subjective indicators (opinion polls on stabilization).19

• Reorganize donor representation in the Fund’s committees according to investment size in order to achieve a better balance between financial contribution and decision-making. To ensure that the strategic decision making of the Fund is more equitable, the countries that contribute smaller amounts should participate in the steering and technical committees through a single representative elected by consensus. To ensure equality in the right to vote and be heard, the total amount represented collectively by the countries that make smaller contributions should be equal to, or not much lower than, the amounts contributed by the major donors.

• Strengthen the call for proposals processes for the presentation of CSO projects. (see relevance). Review the call for proposals procedures in order to make the projects stronger and more competitive, achieving greater CSO participation as implementing partners, especially at the regional level.

• Conduct open calls for proposals aimed at civil society. Calls should allow free competition so that proposals are funded along meritocratic lines that deliver greater quality and impact (see recommendation relevance). Once approved, the Technical Committee should have a mechanism for guaranteeing the co-financing and co-leadership of the project by local and / or national authorities within the framework of a Territorial Stabilization Plan. Applicants should have a territorial ally (e.g. local administration, indigenous authority, victim’s group) that endorses and legitimizes the proposal and another state partner that co-finances it at the central or regional level. In this way, the articulation between state and non-state actors is guaranteed during implementation.

• Empower the Technical Secretariat so that it can carry out an initial proposals filter and provide feedback that ensures greater quality and the inclusion of cross-cutting approaches - in particular gender, ethnic, environmental and Do no Harm. In this way, the Technical Secretariat can ensure that there are better quality proposals before passing them on to the Technical Committee, including the incorporation of quality cross-cutting issues.

To the Technical Committee and Technical Secretariat:

• In order to avoid creating expectations in the communities during the project formulation phase, the elaboration of the concept note must always be ensured before project approval. At
To the Steering Committee:

• Advocate for the Ministry of Defense, the UARIV and the Agency for Territorial Renovation (ART) to support stabilization interventions in a complementary and large-scale way in municipalities with the highest levels of insecurity and victimization according to the new high risk of instability focus. Lack of confidence in the security situation should be addressed in an integrated way and articulated with the other state peace building policies. An increase in security forces presence in critical municipalities is essential in order to prevent or confront the entry of new illegal armed actors. To gain the confidence of the populations most affected by armed conflict, the increase in security force numbers should be preceded by strategies to win over the hearts and minds of the local population. At the same time, the UARIV should accelerate mass psychosocial accompaniment and collective reparation interventions for victims, and the ART should implement high impact productive and infrastructure projects to rehabilitate the territorial economy. All these actions should be articulated with the territorial authorities in order to empower them and make them more responsible under the Territorial Stabilization Plans. These plans should have a budget allocation that guarantees scale and impact.

• In order to guarantee project implementation effectiveness, proposals should be formulated in the field (bottom up approach). Knowledge management, proposal formulation and project implementation based in the field, and that involves the community, local institutions, UN agency staff, experts and implementing partners, ensures that local population needs are taken into account, that the projects have a greater impact in the communities and that they are adapted to local conditions in a sustainable way.

To the Technical Secretariat:

• Adapt the Fund’s guiding document so that it justifies the inclusion of cross-cutting issues within the framework of complying with the international standards of the Sustainable Development Goals. Share the guide as part of the call for proposals process with examples and recommendations on how to incorporate the approaches during proposal preparation. Contract technical expertise to advise implementing partners on the inclusion of all cross-cutting issues, including feedback during the project review and approval stage. Conduct an evaluation of the Fund’s practices from a Do no Harm perspective in order to identify potential risks and mitigation strategies.

7.4 RELATING TO FUND IMPACT AND EFFECTS

To the Steering Committee:

• Advocate for the state to create a system for monitoring and analysing acts of violence trends in municipalities identified as being at high risk of instability in order to measure the impact of the Territorial Stabilization Plans on the security situation. Given the importance of perceptions about security for generating confidence in the state and in peace, it is important that the Steering Committee receive regular reports that allow it to closely monitor any changes in the
security situation in municipalities prioritized for stabilization. These reports should disaggregate statistics about attacks on social leaders due to their high value as promoters of social dialogue and conflict prevention and be used as key inputs for the committee’s periodic context analysis.

• As part of the revision of the Fund’s logical framework, review the relevance of investing resources destined for rapid impact in justice institutions that require a medium- or long-term state strengthening policy. Given that during the conflict communities in highly unstable areas became accustomed to the efficient justice systems of the armed actors, the Fund should strengthen local conflict resolution systems that offer a peaceful alternative that is both quick and viable. These community systems should: 1) comply with Colombian law; 2) use mediation and other efficient alternative dispute resolution mechanisms; and 3) enjoy high levels of recognition and legitimacy in the community.

• Incorporate baseline studies based on geographical zones as part of the second phase exercise to prioritize actions and municipalities for intervention. Taking into consideration that the first phase of the Fund began with urgent activities based on the need for rapid response, the second phase should design a solid baseline study that will help to measure the Fund’s impact in different zones.

To the Technical and Steering Committee:

• As part of the project revision and approval methodology, include a risk analysis and mitigation strategy for social and community leaders in municipalities with the highest threat and homicide levels - Do no Harm. Given the critical security situation in prioritized departments, the Fund should implement preventive protection strategies for community leaders as a responsible Do no Harm practice. The increase in threats and assassinations of these leaders following the signing and implementation of the agreements means that the Fund’s stabilization actions could turn them into targets for emerging armed actors and therefore increase their level of risk. As a minimum, the Fund should have a diagnosis of the risks that social leader participation in its actions could generate and a series of protection measures for their mitigation.

7.5 RELATING TO THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE ACTIONS SUPPORTED BY THE FUND.

To the Steering Committee and the Technical Secretariat:

• Entry and exit strategies should be included in proposal formats and be part of the project revision and approval process. These entry and exit strategies must involve local institutions in order to facilitate intervention ownership and project handover. There should be follow up of entry and exit strategies during project implementation. As far as possible, projects should be incorporated in municipal development plans and PDETs for targeted areas. The projects should be designed from the territory, previously consulted with beneficiary communities, and led by local authorities. Local leadership is important to ensure that Fund interventions become state policy at the territorial level, build trust, and break the dependency on the political will of local administrations. This will go some way to ensuring territorial responsibility and intervention sustainability. If the project responds to local population needs that have been identified through a participatory diagnosis there will be much greater community ownership, including over cross-cutting issues. The Technical Secretariat could prepare the draft and the Steering Committee approve it.

• Without exception, the diagnosis should be able to identify if the projects require continuity, leverage or synergy with other interventions. The
Steering Committee should hold periodic strategic conversations with other Colombia in Peace Fund cooperation sources and territorial entities responsible for PDET implementation. If a project requires continuity, a responsible state body should be identified from the very beginning. The Fund should also begin joint strategic planning dialogues with other medium and long-term development funds so that synergies and handover processes can be leveraged. The Fund could also identify potential state funding for project continuity and thus mitigate the risk of doing harm by not fulfilling expectations raised in the community. Likewise, greater institutional involvement (close coordination with the state) and state investment are needed (see effectiveness).

• **Good practices and lessons learned should be systematized and shared with other Fund implementers in other regions.** The internal communications strategy should incorporate the systematization of good practices and lessons learned for sharing in the regions where the Fund operates. The Technical Secretariat should hire a systematization and learning expert to ensure that lessons learned, and good practices are widely shared.
8. LESSONS LEARNED.

RELEVANCE

The creation of synergies between projects and articulation between institutional actors generates greater community impact. Fund actions were successful in the municipality of Santa Rosa (Cauca) because they managed to combine three success factors: 1) They created synergies between the projects (Manos a la Paz interns technically supported the municipality to maximize the impact of the infrastructure projects of Manos a la Obra); 2) articulated the different institutional actors (UN, municipal authorities and the army) to accelerate the implementation of the infrastructure projects; 3) infrastructure projects that delivered immediate socio-economic benefits to communities. As a result, communities felt that their most urgent needs were quickly met and articulated by the state for the first time.

The formulation of proposals from the field and in conjunction with civil society actors generates greater impact in the rapid response phase. Civil society was taken into account in many of the interventions from proposal preparation to project execution. There was also a high capacity to respond to unmet and emerging needs during the rapid response phase. An example of this is the “Demining Call for Proposals in 40 Highly Affected Municipalities and Mine Risk Education”, implemented by organizations such as HANDICAP, HALO TRUST, R.B. FOUNDATION, CCM and APN. This project contributes effectively in the territories to a better perception of security and confidence building in the state.

Clearance activities by women from the community. La Meseta sector, Municipality of Cajibio – Cauca. ©Juan Manuel Vargas/ HI Colombia
EFFECTIVENESS

Maintaining project revision and approval processes that are clear and equal in all cases generates greater agility and transparency. For example, a project by Save the Children to prevent the recruitment, use and exploitation of children and adolescents by illegal armed groups in the framework of post-conflict had some severe delay problems at the beginning of its implementation. In other cases, they were very agile in responding to the needs that were raised, such as in the collective reparation projects for victims implemented by UNDP (see findings).

EFFECTIVENESS

The articulation between implementing partners and the state generates greater impact and strengthens the coordination and application of good practices and lessons learned. A successful example of successful articulation in the territory is the project “targeting of compensation quotas in strategic rapid response areas” implemented jointly by IOM, UNFPA and UARIV. The beneficiaries feel highly satisfied with the results of their reparation and psychosocial recovery, see the state as the initiative promoter and report significant improvements in social fabric generation. The project’s good practices are widely shared by the UARIV at the national level so that they can be replicated in other territories. This project is also applying the gender approach with particular rigor and the female beneficiaries feel empowered as a result. Although the results of the fund have progressed on average in a moderately satisfactory manner, it is necessary to continue strengthening the Fund’s monitoring and evaluation system in order to identify and share successful impact and good practice examples among implementing partners.

IMPACT

A monitoring and evaluation system that measures the total impact of the projects is important in order to analyse progress in territorial stabilization. Although the impact of the projects is evident in the lives of direct beneficiaries and could be verified through the evaluation interviews and surveys, it is not possible at the moment to measure how much the projects’ impact results in positive change in terms of stabilization at the macro level. For example, there are no surveys at the territorial level to measure changes in perception caused by projects funded by the “Peace Agreement Awareness Raising” call for proposals implemented by organizations such as VIVA LA CIUDADANÍA, SISMA MUJER, RUTA PACIFICA, FUNDEXCO, COLOMBIA DIVERSA, COCOMACIA, CASA MUJER and ANZORC. Several of these organizations express great satisfaction with their work, but the real territorial impact cannot be measured given the short implementation time and lack of monitoring and follow-up. All impact evidence is anecdotal. Organizations such as Cocomacia, on the other hand, measure the impact of their actions by the level of coordination achieved with local authorities and the community in general.

SUSTAINABILITY

Community and local and national government ownership of Fund interventions allows for greater sustainability. A clear example of success is the Manos a la Obra project. In all of the cases the beneficiary community participated in the infrastructure
projects and committed to their on-going maintenance. In some cases, local institutions are also involved, but it is not a requirement for project approval.

Additionally, UNWomen plays a very important role as technical expert in gender issues and the projects that they implement have a very high degree of community ownership. This was evidenced by field interviews. In Antioquia, for example, organized Anoriseña women are the authors of a sustainable territorial development process that builds peace and gender equality. They feel satisfied because the project was a success.  

Manos a la Obra Project: School Improvement, Llano Grande- Tíbú- ASOCATI III

The women interviewed indicated that “thanks to the project women are becoming stronger and more empowered”. In terms of response, they see that through the development of this project there are opportunities for rural women to be proactive, some that has been very absent in previous participation exercises. They believe that a very confidence boost was that women in the communities took strength from their own voice. They feel that they can present their proposals, their points of view, their needs as women in the spaces that have opened up for participation.

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9. BIBLIOGRAPHY


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· Inter-American Convention to Prevent, Punish and Eradicate Violence against Women - Belem do Para. 1994.
10. ANNEXES

Folder 1 - Strategic Criteria and Indicators.
Annex 1.1 Evaluation Questions, Criteria and Indicators.
Annex 1.2 Information Gathering Matrix.

Folder 2 - Evaluation Instruments.
Annex 2.1 - Government Interview Model.
Annex 2.2 - UN Interview Model.
Annex 2.3 Donor Workshop Model.
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Annex 2.7 Workshop Beneficiaries Model.
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Folder 3 - List of Projects and Selection Criteria.
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Annex 3.3 List of Key Actors.

FOLDER 4: Interviews, Workshops and Implementing Partners Surveys.

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Donor Interview Notes AMR.
Donors Interview Notes DH.

Folder 4.2- Government Officials Interviews
1. Alba García interview - OACP.
2. High HR Counsellor Interview.
3. Interview Gloria Ospina - ex Colombia in Peace Fund Director.
5. Interview Lina Marcela Lozano - DNP.
6. Interview Sergio Londoño - APC.
7. Interview Tatiana Flórez - ART.
8. Interview PGN JEP.

Folder 4.3- Interviews UN Officials.
1. FAO interview.
2. UNMAS interview.
3. UNHCHR.
4. UN Women interview.
5. UNDP interview.
Folder 4.4- Collective Interview Technical Secretariat of the Fund

Interview Technical Secretariat Fund.

Folder 4.5- Implementing Partners Interviews, Workshops and Surveys

1. Descontamina Interview.
2. UNDP Implementers Group Interview (1).
3. UNDP Cúcuta implementer group interview.
4. IOM Implementer Rapid Response Interview 105531.
5. Workshop collective reparation implementer Antioquia.
6. Implementer Interview Prepare for Peace 101503.
7. Interview OIM Antioquia.
8. IOM Interview.
9. OSC Interview Workshop.
10. Interview_CasadelaMujer_Sept20.
11. Interview_Centro-de-Pensamiento_Sept27.
15. Interview_VivaLaCiudadania_Sept20.
17. Interview-Partners-Impl-Demining_Sept28.
18. Model Interview with field implementer - Aldeas Infantiles.
19. Group Interview Model - Children’s Villages.
20. Cocomacia Interview.
21. Interview - IOM - Victims Unit.
22. UNDP implementers and beneficiaries Antioquia.
23. Workshop UN Women Antioquia.

Folder 4.6-Mission Notes

1. Mission Note Antioquia.
2. Note Visit Region Cúcuta-NS.
7-Workshops, Interviews and Beneficiary Surveys.
1. Beneficiaries Manos a la Paz 102512.
2. Beneficiaries IOM rapid response 105531.
3. Chair of peace Beneficiaries 102512.
4. Joint Workshop Beneficiaries / Implementer JUSTICIA.
5. Interview Handicap.
6. Interview Manos por la Paz Santa Rosa.
7. Interview Manos a la Paz ART and interns.
8. Interview OIM Cauca.
9. UN Women interview- ASCOM.
10. Conflict transformation interview.
11. Interview victims Carmen del Atrato.
12. Beneficiaries Workshop ANMUCIC 104525.
13. Beneficiaries Workshop Manos a la obra Antioquia.
14. Workshop Beneficiaries IOM and UARIV Chocó.
15. Beneficiaries Workshop UN Women Antioquia.
16. Beneficiaries Workshop Preparémonos para la Paz.
17. Workshop Beneficiaries Local justice systems Antioquia.
   Interview KROC Institute.

FOLDER 5: Matrix of Criteria Indicators and Findings
Evaluation Matrix Final Findings.

FOLDER 6: Consolidated Surveys.
1. Beneficiaries Survey - Answers.
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FOLDER 7: Photographs.
FAO interview.
Interview UNHCHR.
UNDP interview.
Donor Workshop.
Regional Visit: Cúcuta.
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